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Overview 
Over the past two decades, federal and state policymakers have dramatically reshaped the nation’s system of 
cash welfare assistance for low-income families. During this period, there has been considerable variation from 
state to state in approaches to welfare reform, which are often collectively referred to as “welfare-to-work 
programs.” To help states assess various program approaches in an informed way, this report draws on an 
extraordinary body of evidence: results from 28 benefit-cost studies of welfare-to-work programs based on 
random assignment evaluation designs. The synthesis addresses such questions as: Which welfare reform 
program approaches result in positive payoffs on the investments made in them? Which approaches make 
participants better off financially? Which approaches improve the government’s budgetary position? The 
report thus presents findings that can aid policymakers and program developers in assessing the often complex 
trade-offs associated with balancing the desire to ensure the poor of adequate incomes and yet encourage self-
sufficiency. 
Different types of welfare-to-work programs emphasize different goals. Whether a program is judged as a 
success in terms of its benefit-cost performance depends on what policymakers were attempting to accomplish 
in that program. The following policy conclusions are suggested by this synthesis: 
• If a chief goal is to increase participants’ income, then programs that provide individuals with financial 
incentives or earnings supplements intended to encourage work appear to best achieve this goal. While 
beneficial for participants, earnings supplement programs tended to result in a net cost for the government. 
Participants, however, often gained more than a dollar for every dollar the government spent, making this 
type of program an efficient mechanism for transferring income to poor families. 
• If a chief goal is to reduce government expenditures, then programs that require individuals to look for 
jobs immediately and that assign other activities if work is not found are relevant strategies. These pro-
grams tended to be beneficial for the government budget (and to be less expensive than the type of pro-
gram described next) but to result either in small benefits or in net costs for participants. 
• If a chief goal is to balance reducing welfare expenditures with increasing participants’ income, then 
programs that require individuals to participate initially either in an education or training activity or in a 
job search activity can meet this goal. This type of program, when targeted to both short-term and long-
term welfare recipients, was beneficial for both participants and the government’s budget. 
• Mandatory programs that require individuals to participate in General Educational Development (GED) 
completion and Adult Basic Education prior to job search do not appear to achieve the goal they empha-
size: increasing the income of participants. Nor do they achieve the goal of saving government money. 
• Some mandatory work experience programs — which assign individuals to unpaid jobs, often following a 
period of job search — resulted in limited benefits for participants but did provide valuable goods and ser-
vices for the general public. They did not consistently reduce government costs, however.  
These studies measured only benefits and costs that are reliably expressed in dollars. Other benefits and costs 
that are not easily expressed in dollars — for example, changes in children’s school performance or well-being 
— were not estimated and, thus, are not incorporated into the benefit-cost analyses. Overall assessments of 
program types, however, also should take into account noneconomic considerations when determining whether 
a program achieves policymakers’ and society’s goals. 
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Preface 
This report synthesizes findings from an extraordinary body of evidence: benefit-cost 
studies conducted by MDRC of 28 welfare-to-work programs, run in 11 states and two Canadian 
provinces, and involving over 100,000 research sample members. These programs were launched 
prior to the passage of the landmark federal legislation in 1996 that established the Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. The findings from them, however, remain 
highly relevant today because they provide estimates of the benefits and costs of different 
employment strategies for single-parent welfare recipients. Moreover, the programs were run at 
fairly large scale, and all were evaluated using random assignment research designs. 
Benefit-cost analysis is one way that policymakers and program administrators can assess 
a central but complex trade-off of welfare reform: how to ensure that poor families have adequate 
income while at the same time encouraging self-sufficiency. Whether a program is judged as a 
success often depends on what policymakers and program administrators were trying to accom-
plish in that program. Goals can include reducing families’ dependency on government assistance 
and thus reducing government costs, increasing the total income of welfare recipients, or a 
mixture of these two aims. Welfare-to-work programs can seek to attain either or both of these 
objectives in different ways — by stressing participants’ obligations to participate in work-related 
activities or in work itself in exchange for welfare benefits, by emphasizing investment in the 
human capital development of program participants through education and training, by supple-
menting individuals’ earnings when they go to work, and by setting time limits on eligibility for 
welfare. Achieving one of these goals, however, often comes at the expense of achieving the 
others, and herein lies the advantage of benefit-cost analysis: It can examine programs’ effects on 
government budgets and on participants’ incomes separately, thus addressing this trade-off 
directly. 
The key contribution of this synthesis is the specification of this trade-off for different 
types of welfare-to-work programs. Consider, for example, programs that provide individuals 
with financial incentives that are intended to encourage work. Of the six types of programs 
examined in this report, such programs are best able to increase participants’ income; financial 
incentive programs, however, also result in a net cost for government. As another, contrasting 
example, programs that require individuals to look for jobs immediately tend to be beneficial for 
government budgets but result either in only small benefits or in net costs for participants. 
As federal and state leaders seek strategies to move more welfare recipients into work at a 
time when the deteriorating economy is likely to increase the welfare rolls, it is hoped that this 
crosscutting research synthesis will provide them with some of the evidence that they need to 
improve programs for low-income families. 
Gordon L. Berlin 
President 
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Executive Summary 
Starting with the English Poor Laws, policymakers have debated whether providing aid 
to the poor — “cash benefits,” in the modern age — helps or harms people’s long-term self-
sufficiency. The United States has attempted to resolve this dependence/independence conun-
drum in two ways: (1) by establishing a quid pro quo around its basic cash welfare programs — 
the government will provide benefits if recipients agree in return to participate in job search, 
workfare, or education or training programs designed to prepare them for work; and (2) by 
building a safety net around work, as is done through earnings supplements, such as the Earned 
Income Tax Credit (EITC). 
Over the past two decades, in an effort to address this conundrum, federal and state po-
licymakers have dramatically reshaped the nation’s system of cash welfare assistance for low-
income families. Through national legislation and state-initiated reform and experimentation, 
policymakers have sought to transform the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) 
program, now the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. During this pe-
riod, there has been considerable variation from state to state in approaches to welfare reform, 
which are often collectively referred to as “welfare-to-work programs.” Nevertheless, almost all 
welfare-to-work programs have encouraged welfare recipients to work more and, as a result, to 
reduce their families’ long-term reliance on welfare benefits. These goals were given renewed 
emphasis in the provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act (DRA) of 2005, which reauthorized the 
TANF program in early 2006. At the same time, the EITC was greatly expanded during the 
1990s, and many state welfare programs have recently incorporated financial incentives that 
supplement the incomes of employed TANF recipients. 
For a policymaker or program administrator trying to decide the most cost-effective 
way to resolve the dilemma of ensuring families’ adequate income while encouraging work and 
reducing dependency, one possible option is to maximize one goal while ignoring the other. 
That is, he or she can either stress reducing dependency (and thus government cost) or, alterna-
tively, emphasize increasing the total income of welfare recipients. Maximizing one particular 
goal (for example, reducing government expenditures) often comes at the expense of making 
progress on other goals (for example, making program participants better off financially). Most 
public officials, however, would like to achieve both overall goals, that is, to reduce dependency 
while at the same time increasing participant income. 
Furthermore, welfare-to-work programs can seek to attain either or both of these goals 
in different ways — by stressing participants’ obligations to participate in work-related activi-
ties or work itself in exchange for their welfare benefits, by emphasizing investment in the hu-
man capital development of program participants through education and training, by supple-
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menting individuals’ earnings when they go to work, and by setting time limits on individuals’ 
eligibility for welfare. 
To help states assess these trade-offs in an informed way, this report draws on an ex-
traordinary body of evidence from benefit-cost studies of welfare-to-work programs that are 
based on random assignment evaluation designs. The report addresses such questions as: Which 
welfare reform program approaches yield a positive return on investments made, from the per-
spective of program participants and from the perspective of government budgets? Which ap-
proaches make program participants better off financially? In which approaches do benefits ex-
ceed costs from the government’s point of view? The last two of these questions coincide with 
the dilemma discussed above: the trade-off between reducing dependency on government bene-
fits and ensuring adequate incomes for the poor. Because the benefit-cost studies examined pro-
gram effects from the distinct perspectives of government budgets and participants’ incomes 
separately, they address this trade-off directly. 
The report synthesizes findings from benefit-cost studies conducted by MDRC of 28 
welfare-to-work programs, which were run in 11 states and two Canadian provinces and in-
volved over 100,000 research sample members. Most of these programs were operated at fairly 
large scale in the welfare offices involved in their evaluation. Although the programs were 
launched prior to passage of the landmark legislation in 1996 that established TANF, their find-
ings remain highly relevant today because they provide estimates of the benefits and costs of 
different employment strategies for single-parent welfare recipients. 
It is particularly noteworthy that all 28 programs were evaluated using a random as-
signment research design, which allows the effects of the programs to be disentangled from the 
effects of other factors, such as the economy. In this type of research design, often referred to as 
the “gold standard” of research designs, individuals who meet programs’ eligibility require-
ments are randomly assigned by a lottery-like process to either a program group or a control 
group. Those in the program group are eligible for the program under study; those in the control 
group are not. Individuals in both groups are followed over time, and information is collected 
on their employment, earnings, welfare receipt, and other outcomes of interest. The random as-
signment process ensures that when individuals entered each study, there were no systematic 
differences in their characteristics, measured or unmeasured (for example, motivation), between 
the research groups. Thus, any differences between the groups that emerge after random as-
signment — in average earnings or welfare payments, as examples — can be attributed to the 
programs under study.   
The differences in post-random assignment outcomes between the research groups — 
known as impacts — represent programs’ net benefits or net costs, depending on the perspective 
being assessed. A decrease in the program group’s average welfare payments relative to the 
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control group’s, for example, represents a net benefit to government budgets, since the govern-
ment pays out less, but it represents a net cost to program participants because they receive less 
from the government. Similarly, an increase in taxes paid is a net gain to government budgets 
but a net loss to program participants. In contrast, an increase in program participants’ take-
home earnings represents a benefit to them but has no effect — positive or negative — on gov-
ernment budgets (unless tax revenue increases). Finally, operating the programs is a cost shoul-
dered by government but has no effect on the economic position of program participants. To 
determine who gains and who loses from different types of employment strategies for single-
parent welfare recipients, benefits and costs are summed separately from the participant and the 
government perspectives in this synthesis. Inasmuch as these benefits and costs are based on a 
random assignment research design, they are especially reliable and thus valuable for policy 
purposes.   
Findings in Brief 
Each of the 28 programs can be viewed as a test of one of six types of welfare reform 
approaches described in Box ES.1: mandatory work experience programs, mandatory job-
search-first programs, mandatory education-first programs, mandatory mixed-initial-activity 
programs, earnings supplement programs, and time-limit-mix programs. Some programs (man-
datory work experience and mandatory job-search-first programs) tend to place greater empha-
sis on reducing the government’s budget than on increasing the incomes of welfare recipients, 
while others (mandatory education-first and earnings supplement programs) tend to have the 
opposite focus. Still other programs (mixed-initial-activity and time-limit-mix programs) place 
more or less equal emphasis on both goals. 
The analyses presented in this synthesis suggest that many welfare-to-work programs 
are successful in either making program participants better off financially or controlling gov-
ernment costs but that there are often trade-offs between these goals. The key findings are brief-
ly previewed here and are discussed in greater detail below in this Executive Summary. 
• Earnings supplement programs — ones that provide individuals with finan-
cial incentives or earnings supplements intended to encourage work — are an 
efficient mechanism for transferring income to low-income families because 
participants gain more than a dollar for every dollar the government spends. 
Mandatory mixed-initial-activity programs that require individuals to partici-
pate initially either in an education or training activity or in a job search ac-
tivity, depending on their apparent needs, and that enroll both short-term
ES-3 
 Box ES.1 
Descriptions of Program Types 
Mandatory work experience programs: Often following a period of job search, 
individuals in these programs are assigned to unpaid jobs, which are usually located at 
government agencies or nonprofit institutions. 
Mandatory job-search-first programs: Individuals are assigned to job search activi-
ties upon program entry. Other types of assigned activities can follow for individuals 
who do not find jobs. All five of the programs analyzed in this category encouraged 
quick entry into work and strongly enforced a continuous participation mandate. 
Mandatory education-first programs: Individuals are assigned to education activi-
ties prior to job search. The most common of these activities were GED preparation 
classes or Adult Basic Education (ABE). In some programs, individuals could also 
participate in English as a Second Language (ESL), vocational training, or employ-
ment training classes. Typically, job search assignments follow the completion of 
courses of study. 
Mandatory mixed-initial-activity programs: Individuals are assigned to participate 
initially in either an education or training activity or in a job search activity, depend-
ing on an assessment of their needs. Other assigned activities follow these initial ac-
tivities if individuals remain unemployed. 
Earnings supplement programs: Individuals are provided with financial incentives 
intended to encourage work. These incentives supplemented their incomes while at 
work. 
Time-limit-mix programs: These programs require individuals to participate in em-
ployment-orientated activities, provide them with financial incentives, and limit the 
amount of time they remain eligible for welfare benefits. 
and long-term welfare recipients are worthy of consideration by states devel-
oping welfare-to-work programs. They can be cost-beneficial for both the 
government and those required to participate in them. 
• Mandatory job-search-first programs — ones that require individuals to look 
for jobs immediately and then assign other activities if work is not found — 
are worthy of consideration when governments want to reduce their expendi-
tures. These programs tend to be less expensive than mandatory mixed-
initial-activity programs and, thus, to have a more salutary effect on govern-
ment budgets. However, they are unlikely to increase the incomes of those 
required to participate in them. 
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• Mandatory work experience programs — ones that assign individuals to un-
paid jobs — are worthy of consideration as a component of a comprehensive 
welfare-to-work program. Implemented for those who, after a period of time, 
cannot find unsubsidized jobs through job search, these programs are not 
costly to the government and do little harm to participants. Moreover, society 
as a whole can reap some benefit from the output produced at work expe-
rience jobs. 
• The sorts of mandatory education-first programs that have been tested exper-
imentally — ones that require individuals to participate in General Educa-
tional Development (GED) completion and Adult Basic Education prior to 
job search — do not appear to be cost-beneficial. They do little to either in-
crease the incomes of participants or save the government money. 
• Only three time-limit-mix programs — ones that require individuals to par-
ticipate in employment-oriented activities, provide financial incentives for 
work, and limit the amount of time that individuals remain eligible for wel-
fare benefits — are included in this synthesis, and they differ considerably 
from one another. As a result, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions about 
them. While all three appear to have been beneficial for participants, two re-
sulted in substantial net losses from the government budget perspective. 
These findings provide reliable evidence on the financial consequences of different 
types of programs. As discussed below, however, they also underscore the importance of taking 
the policy goals of programs into account when assessing various welfare-to-work approaches. 
Methodology: Conducting Benefit-Cost Analyses of 
Welfare-to-Work Programs 
All the studies included in this synthesis used a similar benefit-cost methodology, which 
involved estimating costs and benefits over a five-year period. This five-year period began at 
the point at which individuals eligible for the programs were randomly assigned to either a pro-
gram group (whose members could take part in the program) or a control group (whose mem-
bers were not eligible for the program). The general approach was to focus on effects that are 
naturally expressed in dollars, such as changes in earnings and public assistance payments pro-
duced by the programs (calculated as the differences in outcomes between randomly assigned 
program and control group members). Because these dollar benefits were received over time, 
they were adjusted, or “discounted,” to take account of the fact that dollars received earlier in 
time are valued more highly than dollars received later. (Discussion at the end of this section 
highlights some possible nonmonetary effects that were not measured.) The cost to the govern-
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ment of operating these programs was also estimated. Discounted dollar values of benefits less 
costs are used to estimate the net values of the programs. The report refers to positive net values 
as “net gains” and to negative net values as “net losses.” A key goal of benefit-cost analysis is to 
determine whether a program results in a net gain or a net loss. 
Benefit-cost analyses of welfare-to-work programs typically examine benefits and 
costs from three perspectives: participants, the government budget, and the whole of society. 
• The participant perspective identifies benefits and costs for program group 
members, indicating how their income changed (taking into account earn-
ings, public assistance payments, and tax payments) as a result of the pro-
gram. 
• The government budget perspective identifies benefits and costs incurred by 
a combination of federal, state, and local government budgets. Effects on the 
government budget are calculated by comparing changes in tax revenue, pub-
lic assistance payments, and the administrative costs of public assistance 
programs with the costs of operating the welfare-to-work programs, which 
result from providing program services and earnings supplements. 
• The social perspective identifies benefits and costs for the whole of society. 
In this synthesis, the social perspective is computed as the sum of the net 
values from the participant and the government budget perspectives. (In the 
case of work experience programs, the value of output produced from unpaid 
work experience jobs is also counted as a social benefit.) There are some fi-
nancial transactions that are a “wash” from society’s viewpoint: For example, 
if a welfare-to-work program causes public assistance payments to decline 
for participants, this situation would be regarded as a savings to the govern-
ment but as a cost to program participants (albeit one that may be offset by 
earnings increases). Because this type of redistribution of resources between 
government and program participants does not change the total resources 
available to society as a whole, it has no effect from the social perspective. 
Earnings gains and program operating costs have the greatest effect on the 
social perspective because they are not a “wash” from society’s viewpoint. 
In principle, the social perspective is the most appropriate of the three perspectives de-
scribed above. After all, it is the most comprehensive, as it encompasses the two more narrow 
perspectives. This might seem to suggest that the participant and the government budget per-
spectives can be ignored. 
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In practice, however, there are two reasons for not doing this. First, the social perspec-
tive does not take into account the possibility that policymakers may be more concerned with 
program effects on participant income than with program effects on the government budget, or 
vice versa. If so, policymakers will presumably want information on the perspective on which 
they wish to focus — either the participant perspective or the government budget perspective. 
Second, it seems likely that a poor person on welfare will value (say) an additional $100 of in-
come more than a higher-income person who is not on welfare. If so, this suggests that the ben-
efits and costs of a program to poor persons cannot be simply added to the benefits and costs of 
the program to a government that is financially supported by middle- and higher-income per-
sons. This suggests looking at program effects on the incomes of welfare recipients and gov-
ernment budgets separately, rather than folding them into a single composite measure by treat-
ing dollar values equally regardless of to whom they accrue. 
This synthesis also reports estimates of the return on investment (ROI) per net dollar 
invested by the government. ROIs were calculated for each program from all three perspectives. 
ROIs are popular with analysts and program operators because they facilitate comparisons of 
the cost-effectiveness of programs per net dollar invested. ROIs, which are often called “bene-
fit-cost ratios,” are computed by dividing program benefits by program operating costs. 
• The participant ROI ratio measures the change in participant income per net 
dollar invested in the program by the government, not by the participants 
themselves. If participant income increases as a result of a program, then the 
participant ROI will be positive. If the participants gained more than a dollar 
in income for each dollar invested by the government (implying that the in-
come transfer process is quite efficient), the participant ROI will be not only 
positive but greater than one. 
• A government budget ROI ratio in excess of one implies that the govern-
ment’s return on its investment, from a budgetary perspective, was in excess 
of its cost. 
• A social ROI ratio of greater than one implies that society has received more 
than a dollar in increased resources for each public dollar invested in the pro-
gram. Because the social perspective in this synthesis is usually defined as 
the sum of the participant and the government budget perspectives, the social 
ROI is usually the sum of the participant and the government budget ROIs. 
(An exception occurs in the case of work experience programs, however, be-
cause the value of output produced from unpaid work experience jobs is 
counted as a social benefit but not as a benefit to either participants or the 
government.) 
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A shortcoming of the benefit-cost analyses reviewed in this synthesis is that they in-
clude only costs and benefits that can be readily estimated in monetary terms. For example, dol-
lar values were not placed on program-induced changes in education, health status, or families’ 
or children’s well-being that are not reflected in program effects on earnings. The value of time 
lost to participants if they work more is also not estimated in monetary terms. In addition, if par-
ticipants in welfare-to-work programs search harder for jobs or work more than they otherwise 
would, workers who compete with them in the labor market may be worse off. This so-called 
displacement effect is difficult to estimate and is not measured in any of the studies considered 
in this synthesis. Benefit-cost analysts of welfare reform initiatives typically do not place dollar 
values on benefits and costs that are not readily estimated in monetary terms because doing so, 
in some instances, would require highly tenuous assumptions (for example, assigning a dollar 
value to reducing poverty, requiring work-related activity as a condition of welfare receipt, or 
increasing children’s well-being). 
Some of the factors just discussed may tend to increase the estimated net gains from 
welfare-to-work programs, while others may tend to decrease the gains. The magnitudes of the 
individual factors and their net direction when combined, however, would obviously vary for 
different programs. In a recent article, Greenberg and Cebulla conclude that the most important 
of the nonmeasured benefits and costs mentioned above are likely to be the value of time lost to 
program participants who increase their hours of work or participation in program activities and 
the displacement effects resulting from job losses by people competing in job markets with wel-
fare-to-work participants.1 Thus, they suggest that the estimated benefits of welfare-to-work 
programs tend to be overstated relative to the costs of these programs. However, the benefit-cost 
studies included in this synthesis assume that program benefits continue to exist for only five 
years;2 the overstatement of the net value of welfare-to-work programs would be mitigated to 
the extent that program benefits actually persevere for longer than five years, although there is 
some evidence that such benefits are unlikely to persist longer than five years in typical welfare-
to-work programs.3 
                                                 
1David Greenberg and Andreas Cebulla, “The Cost-Effectiveness of Welfare-to-Work Programs: A 
Meta-Analysis” (Public Budgeting and Finance 28, 2: 112-145 [Summer 2008]). 
2Many of the benefit-cost studies included in the synthesis observed program effects for five years 
but no longer. Other studies observed program effects for only two or three years and, hence, had to 
project program effects for the remaining years of the five-year time horizon. 
3See David Greenberg, Karl Ashworth, Andreas Cebulla, and Robert Walker, “Do Welfare-to-Work 
Programmes Work for Long?” (Fiscal Studies 25, 1: 27-53 [2004]). 
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 Box ES.2 
Programs Included in the Synthesis, by Type 
Mandatory Work Experience 
• Cook County WIN (Work Incentive) Demonstration (Chicago) 
• San Diego  
• West Virginia Community Work Experience Program (CWEP) 
Mandatory Job-Search-First 
• Atlanta LFA NEWWS (Labor Force Attachment, National Evaluation of 
Welfare-to-Work Strategies) 
• Grand Rapids LFA NEWWS 
• Los Angeles Jobs-First GAIN (Greater Avenues for Independence) 
• Riverside LFA NEWWS 
• SWIM (Saturation Work Initiative Model; San Diego) 
Mandatory Education-First 
• Atlanta HCD (Human Capital Development) NEWWS  
• Columbus Integrated NEWWS 
• Columbus Traditional NEWWS 
• Detroit NEWWS 
• Grand Rapids HCD NEWWS 
• Riverside HCD NEWWS 
Mandatory Mixed-Initial-Activity 
• Alameda GAIN 
• Butte GAIN 
• Los Angeles GAIN 
• Portland NEWWS 
• Project Independence (Florida) 
• Riverside GAIN 
• San Diego GAIN 
• Tulare GAIN 
Earnings Supplements 
• MFIP (Minnesota Family Investment Program) Incentives Only 
• SSP (Canada’s Self-Sufficiency Project) 
• WRP Financial Incentives Only 
Time-Limit Mix 
• FTP (Florida’s Family Transition Program) 
• Jobs First (Connecticut) 
• WRP (Vermont’s Welfare Restructuring Project) 
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Key Findings for Each Program Type 
Each of the 28 welfare-to-work programs included in this synthesis can be viewed as a 
test of one of six particular welfare reform approaches. These different welfare reform strategies 
were initiated at various points in time over the past 25 years in different labor markets and lo-
calities, and they placed different degrees of emphasis on sometimes-competing goals: increas-
ing welfare recipients’ responsibilities in the welfare social contract, reducing government 
budgets, and increasing the incomes of low-income individuals. As shown in Box ES.2, each 
program has been allocated to one of the six mutually exclusive groups mentioned above.4 
While all six program types were designed with the long-term goal of increasing the 
work effort and self-sufficiency of welfare recipients, each program type had a different theory 
for how to accomplish this long-term goal and thus emphasized different intermediate goals. As 
a result, expectations for the benefit-cost findings vary by program type. In other words, a 
judgment of a program’s “success” depends on what the policymakers were attempting to ac-
complish with the program, and this, in turn, influences whether the participant or the govern-
ment budget benefit-cost perspective should be weighted more heavily in assessing the pro-
gram. 
Table ES.1 presents a summary of how each program type performed in the benefit-cost 
analyses from the perspectives of program participants and government budgets, with the results 
highlighted for the perspective that is most emphasized within each program type. Notable from 
the table is that even when a program type is successful in achieving its emphasized goal, it 
does not always look favorable when assessed from another perspective. 
Table ES.2 presents the detailed findings and shows the mean, median, minimum, and 
maximum net value and ROI for each program type and perspective. As indicated above, the 
studies from which these values are drawn estimated costs and benefits over a five-year period 
that began with random assignment, appropriately discounting to account for the greater value 
of dollars received or expended earlier in this period than those received or expended later. The 
mean and median values in Table ES.2 suppress the variation in benefit-cost performance 
among the programs within each program type, but the minimum and maximum values in the 
table convey the extent of the variation. 
Key findings for each program type, which are organized by emphasized goal, are high-
lighted below. These findings are drawn mainly from Tables ES.1 and ES.2. In addition, the 
following discussion examines individual programs that performed exceptionally well or poorly 
from the participant or the government budget perspective. For this purpose, “exceptional” was  
                                                 
4Descriptions of all the programs appear in Appendix A, and publications describing the evaluations 
of each program are listed in References and Bibliography. 
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Program Type
Most 
Emphasized 
Benefit-Cost 
Goal
Did 
Participant 
Income 
Increase?
Did 
Government 
Budgetary 
Position 
Improve? Further Considerations
Mandatory work experience Reduce 
welfare costs
Mixed MIXED Small net values from 
participant and government 
perspectives; from social 
perspective, consistent net 
gains due to work 
experience output
Mandatory job-search-first Reduce 
welfare costs
No YES Small net gains or 
substantial net losses to 
participants
Mandatory education-first Increase 
participant 
income
NO No Least successful program 
type
Mandatory mixed-initial-activity Balance 
reducing 
welfare costs 
and increasing 
participant 
income
YES YES Goal achieved by all but 
two programs targeting long-
term welfare recipients
Earnings supplement Increase 
participant 
income
YES No Largest participant net 
gains; an efficient 
mechanism for transferring 
income, even though 
resulting in net losses for 
government budget
Time-limit-mix                                Balance 
reducing 
welfare costs 
and increasing 
participant 
income
YES MIXED For the government budget, 
losses more often than gains
Welfare-to-Work Program Benefits and Costs
Table ES.1
Benefit-Cost Performance of Each Program Type
NOTE: The underlined, full-capitalized perspective is the benefit-cost perspective that is most useful for 
determining whether the program type achieved its most emphasized benefit-cost goal. 
(welfare time limits, 
required activities, and financial  
incentives for work)
 
ES-11 
somewhat arbitrarily defined as programs that, after discounting, resulted in either net gains or 
net losses of over $3,000 per program group member over the five-year study period from either 
the participant perspective or the government budget perspective or from both perspectives. 
Under this definition, 12 of the 28 programs included in the synthesis qualified as exceptional. 
Programs Most Focused on Reducing Welfare Costs 
Mandatory job-search-first and mandatory work experience programs are particularly 
focused on reducing welfare dependency and, hence, the cost of welfare. Thus, the government 
budget perspective is especially relevant in judging such programs. 
• Mandatory job-search-first programs reduce government expenditures, 
thereby achieving their key objective, but do little to increase the incomes of 
those required to participate in them. From the government budget perspec-
tive, mandatory job-search-first programs usually resulted in substantial net 
gains and in ROIs greater than one. Indeed, two of these programs (Grand 
Rapids LFA NEWWS and Los Angeles Jobs-First GAIN) resulted in excep-
tionally large net gains for the government of over $3,000 per client over five 
years. 
• Mandatory-job-search-first programs usually had net gains from the so-
cial perspective, mostly as a result of the substantial net gains to the govern-
ment that they produced. 
• Mandatory work experience programs are not especially successful in re-
ducing government budgetary costs, but they produce small net gains or 
break even from the participant perspective. From the government budget 
perspective, two out of three of these programs resulted in small net losses, 
and one produced a modest net gain. 
• Notably, mandatory work experience programs also provided an impor-
tant benefit to society in the value of output produced at work experience 
jobs. As a consequence, they all had positive net benefits from the social 
perspective. 
Programs Most Focused on Increasing Participant Income 
A major goal of earnings supplement and mandatory education-first programs is to 
make participants better off. Thus, the participant perspective is particularly pertinent in assess-
ing these programs. 
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Table ES.2
Five-Year Summary Statistics of Net Value
and ROI per Program Group Member,
by Program Type (in 2006 dollars)
Program Type Mean Median Minimum Maximum
Mandatory work experience
Participant perspective $285 $310 -$163 $707
(4.77) (2.22) -(0.32) (12.40)
Government budget perspective $103 -$328 -$365 $1,002
(1.04) (0.35) -(5.40) (8.17)
Social perspective $1,162 $1,261 $503 $1,720
(8.88) (9.82) (3.50) (13.32)
Mandatory job-search-first
Participant perspective -$570 $196 -$2,729 $837
-(0.16) (0.04) -(1.13) (0.49)
Government budget perspective $1,954 $2,266 -$932 $3,521
(1.97) (2.34) (0.81) (2.77)
Social perspective $1,215 $654 -$946 $3,552
(1.74) (1.27) (0.80) (3.06)
Mandatory education-first
Participant perspective -$1,360 -$1,554 -$3,571 $569
-(0.27) -(0.32) -(0.65) (0.13)
Government budget perspective -$745 -$387 -$3,943 $735
(0.86) (0.88) (0.41) (1.13)
Social perspective -$2,234 -$2,510 -$3,545 -$205
(0.57) (0.50) (0.38) (0.92)
Mandatory mixed-initial-activity
Participant perspective $808 $1,422 -$2,178 $2,651
(0.27) (0.35) -(0.32) (1.19)
Government budget perspective -$67 $89 -$4,803 $6,337
(1.27) (1.06) (0.17) (2.84)
Social perspective $515 $774 -$7,042 $6,221
(1.47) (1.10) (0.13) (3.79)
(continued)
Welfare-to-Work Program Benefits and Costs
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Program Type Mean Median Minimum Maximum
Earnings supplementa
Participant perspective 5,396 $5,602 $239 $10,141
(4.22) (4.22) (3.72) (4.71)
Government budget perspective -$3,532 -$1,472 -$10,958 -$228
-(0.16) -(0.16) -(0.91) (0.58)
Social perspective $1,865 $1,132 -$815 $6,009
(4.06) (4.06) (2.82) (5.30)
Time-limit-mix
Participant perspective $3,525 $1,983 $1,754 $6,839
(1.27) (1.27) (0.19) (2.51)
Government budget perspective -$4,279 -$5,111 -$8,128 $402
(0.19) (0.20) -(0.88) (1.26)
Social perspective -$961 $1,512 -$6,374 $1,978
(1.40) (1.55) (0.37) (2.26)
Table ES.2 (continued)
SOURCES: Published reports from the program evaluations. See the complete report for References and 
Bibliography. 
NOTES: Appendix B in the complete report presents individual results for each type of program and perspective.  
The ROI appears in parentheses.
Earnings supplement ROI numbers refer only to two of four programs. Two programs resulted in a savings from 
operating costs, so the ROI calculation did not make sense and thus is not presented.
aApplicant results for Canada's Self-Sufficiency Project (SSP) are a six-year estimate.
 
• Earnings supplement programs meet their key goal of producing substan-
tial net gains for participants; these net gains are often larger than the pro-
gram costs to the government, suggesting that such programs are an effective 
means of transferring income to the working poor. Because the benefit-cost 
studies included in this synthesis assume that program benefits continued to 
exist for only five years, earnings supplement programs would be even more 
effective than implied if — as a result of job experience gained while partici-
pants received earnings supplements — the programs’ effects on earnings 
persisted beyond this period. Unfortunately, however, these effects dimi-
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nished over time, reaching zero before or just after the end of the five-year pe-
riod.5 
• Two earnings supplement programs (MFIP Incentives Only and SSP) 
qualified as “exceptional” in a positive sense from the participant perspec-
tive. Both featured earnings supplements that resulted in exceptionally large 
net gains for participants; however, MFIP resulted in exceptionally large net 
losses from the government perspective (that is, gains and losses of over 
$3,000 per client over five years), while the net losses to the government’s 
budget were not exceptionally large for SSP. This difference is probably at-
tributable to the SSP program’s limiting the receipt of earnings supplements 
to individuals who worked at least 30 hours a week. 
• Among the earnings supplement programs, only one resulted in a net loss 
from the social perspective, and this loss was modest. As the social perspec-
tive is the sum of the participant and government perspectives, these rather 
positive results are driven by the large net gains to participants. They suggest 
that earnings supplement programs are an efficient mechanism for transfer-
ring income to low-income families, inasmuch as they cost less than a dollar 
for each dollar of increase in the incomes of the poor. Most transfer pro-
grams, in contrast, cost the government more than a dollar for each dollar in-
crease in the incomes of recipients. 
• Mandatory education-first programs fail to meet their key objective of in-
creasing the incomes of those required to participate in them, and they also 
do not reduce government expenditures. 
• Under the definition of an “exceptional” net loss that is used in this synthesis 
(that is, a loss of over $3,000 per client over five years), one mandatory 
education-first program (Riverside HCD NEWWS) resulted in an excep-
tionally large net loss for participants, and another (Atlanta HCD NEWWS) 
produced an exceptionally large net loss from the government perspective. 
Programs Focused on Balancing Participant and Government Gains 
Some programs, such as mixed-initial-activity programs and time-limit-mix programs, 
attempt to balance reducing government costs with increasing the financial well-being of partic-
                                                 
5For a detailed analysis, see Charles Michalopoulos, Does Making Work Pay Still Pay? An Update 
on the Effects of Four Earnings Supplement Programs on Employment, Earnings, and Income (New 
York: MDRC, 2005). 
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ipants. One way to judge these programs is to rely on both the participant and the government 
perspective. 
• Mandatory mixed-initial-activity programs are often cost-beneficial for 
both the government and the participants, thereby meeting their key objec-
tives. 
• Six of the mandatory mixed-initial-activity programs in this category 
enrolled both short-term and long-term welfare recipients, and, in general, 
these six programs achieved their goal: With a few exceptions, they were 
cost-beneficial for both the government and the participants. The remaining 
two programs (Alameda GAIN and Los Angeles GAIN), which limited par-
ticipation to long-term welfare recipients and were exceptionally expensive 
to operate, did not produce positive results. Indeed, these two programs pro-
duced exceptionally large net losses of over $3,000 from the government 
perspective. Los Angeles GAIN also resulted in net losses of over $2,000 
from the participant perspective. 
• Two mandatory mixed-initial-activity programs (Portland NEWWS and 
Riverside GAIN) produced exceptionally large net gains of over $3,000 per 
client from the government budget perspective. In addition, Riverside GAIN 
produced a net gain for participants of $2,651 per client, thereby also almost 
qualifying as exceptional from the participant perspective. These two pro-
grams put considerable emphasis on job search. In addition, Riverside GAIN 
put considerable pressure on most participants to take jobs as quickly as 
possible (although programs that do not qualify as exceptional followed this 
practice as well). 
• However, the program that produced the largest net gains for the government 
budget, Portland NEWWS, encouraged participants to wait for “good” jobs. 
• Time-limit-mix programs produced mixed results in meeting their goal of 
balancing reducing long-term government expenditures with making partici-
pants better off. While all three of these programs resulted in net gains for 
participants, two produced net losses from the government budget perspec-
tive. Both programs with net losses from the government budget perspective 
had exceptionally large net losses (over $3,000 per client over five years). 
One of these programs, Florida’s FTP, had very large operating costs, and the 
other program, Connecticut’s Jobs First, featured generous earnings supple-
ments. Connecticut’s Jobs First also had exceptionally large gains from the 
participant perspective. 
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• Two of the three time-limit-mix programs resulted in net gains from the so-
cial perspective. 
Conclusions About Program Type 
The benefit-cost findings for the six program types suggest the following conclusions: 
• Reducing welfare costs. Both job-search-first programs and mandatory un-
paid work experience programs emphasize reducing government costs. Job-
search-first programs, which sought to reach this goal by getting people jobs 
quickly, were generally successful in doing so. They tended to be beneficial 
for the government budgets but resulted either in small benefits or in losses 
for participants. Mandatory unpaid work experience programs that required 
people to work in community jobs in return for their welfare benefits, often 
following a period of job search, were less successful in reducing govern-
ment costs. Some mandatory unpaid work experience programs increased the 
incomes of participants, although the net gains were small, and they also 
provided goods and services for the general public. 
• Increasing participant income. Both earnings supplement and mandatory 
education-first programs emphasize increasing participant income. Earnings 
supplement programs appear to be highly successful in meeting this goal, but 
education-first programs are not. Earnings supplement programs benefit par-
ticipants by boosting their returns from working, but they tend to increase 
government costs. Participant gains, however, often exceed government 
losses. Education-first programs, which emphasize GED completion and 
Adult Basic Education, sometimes have negative effects on both participant 
income and the government budget.  (None of the studied education-first 
programs, however, made intensive investments in training or college.) 
• Balancing participant and government gains. Mandatory mixed-initial-
activity and time-limit-mix programs intend both to increase participant in-
comes and to reduce government budgets. Mixed-initial-activity programs 
were often successful in doing this; programs that enrolled all welfare recip-
ients, as opposed to only long-term welfare recipients, were beneficial from 
both the participant and the government budget perspective. Results for the 
time-limit-mix programs are inconclusive. Time-limit-mix programs were 
beneficial for participants but tended to result in losses, sometimes substan-
tial ones, for the government. 
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Conclusion 
The above discussion is not intended to suggest that each type of welfare-to-work pro-
gram should be assessed from only a dominant perspective. All three perspectives are germane, 
but the goals most emphasized by policymakers naturally affect which perspective is given the 
most weight. 
If one’s chief goal is to increase participants’ income, then earnings supplement pro-
grams appear to best achieve this goal. If one’s chief goal is to reduce government expenditures, 
then mandatory job-search-first programs can be considered. If one’s chief goal is to balance 
reducing welfare expenditures with increasing participants’ income, then mandatory mixed-
initial-activity programs appear to be promising. Notably, two of the program types — manda-
tory work experience programs and time-limit-mix programs — produced mixed results in 
terms of their emphasized goals. Finally, programs in the mandatory education-first category, 
which emphasized GED completion and Adult Basic Education, did not achieve the goal of 
greatest emphasis for them: that of increasing the income of participants. They were also not 
successful in saving the government money. 
However, it is important to bear in mind that only costs and benefits that are naturally 
expressed in dollars were measured. Policymakers — and society in general — also seek to ac-
complish goals that are not easily expressed in dollars and cents. This underscores the fact that 
benefit-cost analyses can monetize only some costs and benefits; goals and values must be tak-
en into account in overall assessments of program types. 
The benefit-cost findings that are examined in detail in this synthesis can aid policy-
makers and program developers in assessing the often complex trade-offs associated with ba-
lancing the desire to ensure the poor of adequate incomes with the goal of encouraging self-
sufficiency. As states’ leaders seek strategies to move more welfare recipients into work, it is 
hoped that this report will provide them with some of the evidence they need to improve their 
policies for low-income families. 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Over the past two decades, federal and state policymakers have dramatically reshaped 
the nations’ system of cash welfare assistance for low-income families. Through national 
legislation and state-initiated reform and experimentation, policymakers have sought to trans-
form the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, now the Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. During this period, there has been considera-
ble variation from state to state in approaches to welfare reform. These approaches, which are 
often collectively referred to as “welfare-to-work programs,” include attempting to get welfare 
recipients into jobs quickly through intensive job search activities; providing education and 
training to build up welfare recipients’ skills; using financial incentives to motivate people to 
work; putting time limits on how long welfare assistance can be received; and providing unpaid 
work experience as a means of imparting good work habits and skills. While varied in what they 
do, almost all welfare-to-work programs have shared a common long-term goal: reducing 
families’ reliance on welfare benefits, primarily by increasing work among recipients. 
Results reported elsewhere have shown that many welfare-to-work program approaches 
can, indeed, increase adults’ employment and earnings and reduce their welfare receipt. In some 
cases, individuals’ income has been increased as well.1 In addition, some types of program 
approaches have been found to have positive effects on welfare recipients’ preschool-age and 
elementary school-age children. In these programs, children’s levels of school achievement 
increased, most probably due to increases in their parents’ income.2 
An obvious question to ask, however, is: Which of these welfare reform program ap-
proaches result in a positive payoff on the investments made in them? That is, which of these 
welfare reform program approaches make participants better off financially? And in which 
instances do the benefits from welfare reform program approaches exceed their costs from the 
government’s or society’s standpoint? If several different approaches have positive results, then 
one also can ask another question: Which approach performs best? Benefit-cost analysis — 
which uses a variety of techniques to determine whether the benefits or the costs of policies or 
programs are larger — has been designed specifically to address such questions.3 Moreover, it 
provides readily communicated and easily understood summary figures, such as estimates of the 
                                                 
1See Bloom and Michalopoulos (2001). 
2See Morris et al. (2001); Morris, Gennetian, and Duncan (2005). 
3This synthesis report uses the term “benefit-cost analysis” to be consistent with previous MDRC publica-
tions; this term, however, is no different in meaning than “cost-benefit analysis.” 
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net value4 of a program (benefits less costs) and returns on investment (benefits divided by 
investment costs). 
In fact, a number of benefit-cost studies have been conducted of welfare-to-work pro-
grams that were implemented in states or localities during the 1980s and 1990s. This report 
synthesizes findings from benefit-cost studies conducted by MDRC of 28 of these welfare 
reform initiatives.5 The synthesis provides a wealth of information on the costs, benefits, and 
returns on investment of a number of different welfare reform strategies, and it supplies a 
perspective for states to consider as they seek to make future TANF programmatic decisions. 
Although the programs included in the synthesis were launched prior to passage of the land-
mark federal welfare reform law of 1996, which established the TANF block grant, they contain 
elements of most states’ current welfare reform programs. Moreover, the programs encompass 
features that many states are now likely to examine more closely as they seek to meet the more 
stringent welfare-to-work program participation rates embodied in the Deficit Reduction Act 
(DRA) of 2005 that reauthorized the 1996 welfare reform law. In brief, DRA significantly 
strengthens the requirement that a state must have a certain percentage of its welfare caseload in 
work or participating in approved work-related activities for a set number of hours each week or 
the state faces a reduction in its welfare block grant. 
Together, the studies of the 28 welfare-to-work programs that are synthesized in this re-
port, which were run in 11 states and two Canadian provinces, involved more than 100,000 
research sample members. Thus, these programs operated in “real-world” conditions at a 
significant scale. (Appendix A presents brief descriptions of all 28 programs.) All the studies 
used random assignment research designs, resulting in probably the most extensive and most 
reliable database of findings about welfare-to-work programs ever assembled. Although the 
studies began in the mid-1980s and early 1990s — before passage of the 1996 welfare reform 
law — their findings remain highly relevant today because they provide detailed data about the 
benefits and costs of different employment strategies for groups of welfare recipients, mostly 
female single parents. Little has been done to synthesize the benefits and costs of welfare-to-
work initiatives and to compare how the return on the government’s investment differs for 
various types of interventions. Thus, this report fills an important knowledge gap. 
                                                 
4Traditionally, benefit-cost analyses refer to program benefits minus program costs as the “net present 
value.” For simplicity, this report refers to the net present value as the “net value.” 
5The present report can be viewed as a companion to the 2001 synthesis by Bloom and Michalopoulos of 
the estimated effects of welfare-to-work programs on earnings, income, and welfare benefits. Both syntheses 
cover many of the same programs. The only exceptions are three older mandatory work experience programs, 
which are covered in this synthesis (see footnote 7) but not in the 2001 document, and Milwaukee’s New Hope 
program, which is covered in the earlier synthesis but not in this one. (New Hope, unlike the other programs 
included here, was not focused exclusively on welfare recipients and applicants, and the benefit-cost analysis 
for the full New Hope sample was only a short-term one.) 
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Each of the 28 welfare-to-work studies included in the synthesis can be viewed as a test 
of a particular type of welfare reform strategy. Each of these strategies was developed to 
accomplish multiple goals. Based on the type of strategy that each of the studied programs 
embodies, they have been allocated to one of the following six mutually exclusive groups, 
which are listed in the order in which they developed historically:6 
• Mandatory work experience programs (three programs) 
• Mandatory job-search-first programs (five programs) 
• Mandatory education-first programs (six programs) 
• Mandatory mixed-initial-activity programs (eight programs) 
• Earnings supplement programs (three programs) 
• Time-limit-mix programs (three programs)7 
While each of the six program types was designed with the long-term goal of increasing 
the work effort and self-sufficiency of welfare recipients, each type of program had a different 
theory for how to accomplish this long-term goal and emphasized different intermediate goals. 
For example, the most salient goal of mandatory work experience and mandatory job-search-
first programs is to reduce government costs. In contrast, the featured goal of mandatory 
education-first and earnings supplement programs is to increase participant income. The two 
other program types — mandatory mixed-initial-activity programs and time-limit-mix programs 
— seek to balance reducing government costs with increasing participant income. Thus, 
whether a program is judged as a success from a benefit-cost perspective depends on what goals 
policymakers weighted most heavily. 
Moreover, as will be seen, while benefit-cost analyses of welfare-to-work programs fo-
cus on how these programs affect the financial situation of welfare families and the government, 
the goals of many programs go beyond this. Some programs, for example, seek to boost the 
self-esteem of welfare recipients, prize increased labor market participation by welfare recip-
                                                 
6The WRP study is included in two categories: earnings supplement programs and time-limit-mix pro-
grams. This is because the WRP study had a three-way random assignment design (which generated a control 
group, a WRP group, and a WRP Financial Incentives Only group) that allowed the examination of the costs 
and benefits of earnings supplements as well as the costs and benefits of a time-limit mix.  
7This synthesis focuses on benefit-cost analyses from the more recent of MDRC’s random assignment 
evaluations of mandatory employment programs. Thus, studies that were initiated in the first part of the 1980s 
have been excluded from the synthesis, with the exception of three mandatory work experience programs. This 
exception was made because there have been only a limited number of random assignment studies that isolate 
the effect of work experience. 
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ients even if their incomes do not increase, or seek to engender long-term positive effects on the 
children of welfare recipients. The benefit-cost analyses that are reviewed in this synthesis were 
not designed to appraise whether these goals were accomplished. 
Taken together, these six categories represent close to the full range of strategies that 
have been tried by the welfare system under TANF. These strategies are more fully described in 
the individual chapters on each category, where the programs included in each category are also 
listed. To facilitate comparisons across categories, similar questions are asked about the pro-
grams in each category: What are their costs? What are their benefits? From the separate and 
distinct perspectives of government budgets, program participants, and society as a whole, do 
these types of programs produce benefits that exceed costs? What is the return per net dollar 
invested by the government in these types of programs? The answers to these questions will be 
of particular interest to persons with responsibilities for designing welfare-to-work programs. 
The 28 programs that are included in the synthesis have each been assigned to only one 
category on the basis of the best judgment as to the key innovation being tested.8 However, it is 
important to keep in mind that some included programs actually tested two or more welfare 
reform strategies (for example, mandatory employment services in combination with work 
experience). Thus, differences in the benefit-cost results within a category may result because 
some programs within the category represent a “pure” form of the strategy and others do not. 
The reader is alerted whenever this could be the case. 
Chapter 2 of this report describes MDRC’s approach in conducting benefit-cost analy-
ses of welfare-to-work programs. Then the benefit-cost findings for each of the six program 
categories are presented in Chapters 3 through 8. To aid comparisons across categories, these 
six chapters are organized similarly: They begin with a description of the program category,9 
then present a brief summary of the benefit-cost findings for programs in that category, and 
subsequently present a detailed analysis of the findings. Finally, Chapter 9 compares the 
program types in terms of the costs and benefits that they engender, and it concludes the report 
by discussing some policy implications. 
 
 
8Again, the WRP study, which tested two distinct programs, is included in two categories: earnings sup-
plement programs and time-limit-mix programs.  
9Appendix Table B.1 presents selected characteristics of the sample members in each program included in 
this synthesis.  
Chapter 2 
Conducting Benefit-Cost Analyses of 
Welfare-to-Work Programs 
This chapter describes the benefit-cost framework used in MDRC’s evaluations, the 
random assignment design on which MDRC’s evaluations of welfare-to-work programs are 
based, the methodology used in estimating the costs and benefits of welfare-to-work programs, 
and how the return on investment in these programs is calculated. The chapter mentions a 
number of issues in conducting benefit-cost analyses and discusses some limitations of the 
approach.  
MDRC’s Benefit-Cost Accounting Framework 
Table 2.1 displays the accounting framework that is used in MDRC’s benefit-cost stu-
dies.  Plus signs indicate anticipated sources of benefits, and minus signs indicate anticipated 
sources of costs, from three different perspectives: those of program participants, the govern-
ment budget, and society as a whole. A zero implies that there is neither a cost nor a benefit 
from the perspective being considered. The question marks at the bottom of each column 
indicate that the sum of the benefits and costs listed above it — that is, the net value of a 
particular program — can be either positive or negative. In this report, positive net values are 
called “net gains,” and negative net values are called “net losses.” A key goal of benefit-cost 
analysis is to determine whether a program results in a net gain or a net loss. (Box 2.1 defines 
the key terms used in benefit-cost analysis.) 
The first column in Table 2.1 shows benefits and costs from the perspective of partici-
pants in a welfare-to-work program, and the second column displays benefits and costs that 
accrue to the government as a result of operating the program. All the effects on program 
participants relate to changes in their incomes, and all the effects on the government concern 
changes in the government’s budget. As discussed below, however, welfare-to-work programs 
can have important nonfinancial effects that are not usually captured by benefit-cost analyses. 
The most important of the financial effects that are listed in Table 2.1 are those on program 
operating costs and earnings. Earnings effects are important in and of themselves but also 
because they strongly influence program effects on taxes and eligibility for transfer payments 
(that is, welfare, food stamps, and Medicaid). 
Notice that Table 2.1 implies that if a welfare-to-work program causes participant tax 
payments to increase or causes welfare payments, food stamps, or the availability of Medicaid 
to decline for participants, this situation should be regarded as a savings or benefit to the 
5 
Government
Financial Effect Participant Budget Society
Earnings and fringe benefits + 0 +
Taxes (including EITC) – + 0
Welfare – + 0
Food stamps – + 0
Medicaid – + 0
Work experience output 0 0 +
Administrative cost of transfer programs 0 + +
Operating costs 0 – –
Net value (net gain or net loss) ? ? ?
Accounting Perspective
Table 2.1
The Expected Financial Effects of Welfare-to-Work Programs
Welfare-to-Work Program Benefits and Costs
NOTES: A plus sign indicates an expected benefit, and a minus sign indicates an expected 
cost. A zero indicates that the expected effect is neither a benefit nor a cost.
The question marks at the bottom of each column indicate that the sum of the benefits and 
costs listed above it — that is, the net value of a particular program — can be either positive or 
negative.
 
Box 2.1 
Key Terms 
Mandatory work experience programs: The present value of the sum of a program’s 
benefits and costs. (Values are discounted to account for cash flows occurring at different 
times over the five-year period.) This is the number used to assess whether a program was 
beneficial in benefit-cost analysis. 
Net gain: A positive net value. The benefits of the program outweigh the costs. 
Net loss: A negative net value. The costs of the program outweigh the benefits. 
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government but as a cost to program participants (albeit a cost that may be offset by earnings in-
creases). Thus, a program can result in net gains from the standpoint of program participants if 
benefits (typically increased earnings) exceed costs (typically reduced transfer payments and 
increased tax payments). A program can produce net gains from the government budget 
perspective if benefits (typically increased tax revenue,1 decreased transfer payments, and a 
decreased cost for administering transfer programs) exceed the cost of providing program 
services and earnings supplements. (Contrary to other welfare-to-work programs, earnings 
supplement programs, by design, cause public assistance payments to increase.) Because the 
treatment of benefits and costs differs greatly between the program participant and the govern-
ment budget perspectives, it is very important that readers who wish to compare the findings 
presented in this synthesis with findings from other studies be aware of which benefit-cost 
perspective is being analyzed in the other studies. 
The third column in Table 2.1 shows benefits and costs from the perspective of society 
as a whole. In principle, the social perspective should count all the benefits and costs of a 
program regardless of to whom they accrue. Thus, it is the most inclusive of the three perspec-
tives being considered. As shown in Table 2.1, it is computed, in practice, by simply summing 
the benefits and costs that accrue to two components of society:  program participants and the 
government.2 Hence, increases in tax payments and reductions in welfare, food stamps, and 
Medicaid are treated as neither a benefit nor a cost to society as a whole but, rather, as simply 
income transferred from one component of society to another. (Box 2.2 outlines the three 
benefit-cost perspectives.) 
There are at least three serious shortcomings with the social perspective as it is used in 
practice. First, it is not as inclusive as it should be. Benefits and costs that do not affect either 
participants or the government’s budget are not usually counted in MDRC’s benefit-cost studies 
because they are typically impractical to measure. For example, an uncounted cost may be 
imposed on low-wage workers who do not participate in welfare-to-work programs if those who 
do participate obtain jobs that the nonparticipants would otherwise have held. Little is known
                                                 
1Table 2.1 shows welfare-to-work programs as increasing government tax revenue because they are 
expected to increase earnings, and, as a result, tax payments often increase. However, because program 
effects on tax payments include effects on the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), some programs that 
increase earnings cause a decrease in government tax revenues. The direction of the effect on taxes 
depends on the earnings of program participants who find employment: If they are in lower-paid jobs, 
then they will likely receive EITC payments; but if they are in higher-paid jobs, then they may not be 
eligible for EITC and will instead pay taxes to the government. 
2The participant and government perspectives may not sum to the social perspective due to employ-
er-paid payroll taxes and work experience output (see footnote 3). In the studies in this synthesis, payroll 
taxes (for example, the employers’ portion of Social Security and Medicare taxes) were often shown as 
zero to participants and as a benefit to government. Because employers are part of society, payroll taxes 
are then treated as zero in the social perspective, under the assumption that they were paid by employers.  
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 Box 2.2 
Benefit-Cost Perspectives 
Benefit-cost analysis typically examines benefits and costs from three perspectives: partici-
pants, government budgets, and society.  
Participant perspective: Identifies benefits and costs for program group members, indicat-
ing how they fared as a result of the program. In general, a program results in net gains from 
the participant perspective if program group members’ benefits (typically increased earnings) 
exceed their costs (typically reductions in transfer payments and greater tax payments). 
Government budget perspective: Identifies benefits and costs incurred by a combination of 
federal, state, and local government budgets. In general, a program produces net gains from 
the government budget perspective if benefits that accrue to the government’s budget (typi-
cally increased tax revenue, decreased transfer payments, and decreased administrative costs 
of transfer programs) exceed the cost of providing program services and earnings supple-
ments. (Contrary to other welfare-to-work programs, earnings supplement programs, by 
design, cause public assistance payments to increase.) 
Social perspective: Identifies benefits and costs for society. In this synthesis, the social 
perspective is the sum of the net values from the participant perspective and the government 
budget perspective. In the case of work experience programs, the value of output produced 
from unpaid work experience jobs is also counted. 
about the size of this so-called displacement effect because it is inherently difficult to measure. 
The value of the social benefits of income redistribution and reductions in poverty are also not 
counted in MDRC’s benefit-cost analyses. The clear but difficult-to-measure benefits associated 
with society’s preferences for work over welfare are also not counted. The one social benefit 
that MDRC does often estimate, even though it accrues to neither participants nor the govern-
ment budget, is the value of output produced on unpaid work experience jobs.3 
Second, the social perspective does not include nonmonetary effects on participants be-
cause MDRC’s analyses include only benefits and costs that are readily estimated in monetary 
terms. Basically, it is simply not possible to measure the dollar value of all the potential benefits 
and costs of the evaluated programs. For example, dollar values were not placed on program-
induced changes in education, health status, or families’ or children’s well-being that are not 
reflected in program effects on earnings. In addition, out-of-pocket work-related expenses by 
participants on child care and travel to jobs that were not reimbursed by a program were usually 
not measured. Moreover, the analyses did not consider sample members’ forgone personal and 
                                                 
3Work experience output is valued as the compensation that employers would have had to pay in the 
regular labor market to hire employees with the same level of productivity.  
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family activities that might result from increased work. Benefit-cost analysts of welfare reform 
initiatives typically do not place dollar values on the benefits and costs listed above because 
doing so, in some instances (for example, determining the monetary value of improvements in 
health status), would require more resources than are available for the study; in other instances, 
doing so would require highly tenuous assumptions (for example, assigning a dollar value to 
reducing poverty or increasing children’s well-being). 
All the benefits and costs just mentioned result from program effects on participants, 
not on the government’s budget. Thus, omitting these benefits and costs means that the dollar 
estimates of program net values for participants will be either understated or overstated to the 
extent that nonmonetary benefits or costs are important. In contrast, an estimate of how a 
program affects the government’s budgetary position is comprehensive; nothing is left out. 
Thus, it is somewhat problematic to compute the net value of a program to society by summing 
benefits and costs that accrue to the government budget, which should be fully inclusive, and 
those that accrue to program participants, which are not fully inclusive. 
In general, in assessing the benefit-cost findings, it is important to keep in mind that, 
because of omitted benefits and costs, some welfare-to-work programs that appear beneficial 
from the participant perspective may, in fact, not be beneficial, and vice versa. Perhaps more 
important in the context of this synthesis, comparisons among the programs that are examined 
may be somewhat distorted. Notably, the benefit-cost findings from the government budget 
perspective do not present similar problems.   
The third practical limitation of the social perspective is that the persons who pay most 
of the taxes supporting the government tend, on average, to have higher incomes than the 
welfare population. There is a considerable benefit-cost literature that argues that the gains and 
losses of lower-income persons should be valued more highly than those of higher-income 
persons. One justification for this argument is that the value individuals put on each additional 
dollar they receive is likely to be higher for low-income persons than for higher-income 
persons. Thus, it is not clear that a dollar gained or lost by participants in welfare-to-work 
programs should be treated the same as a dollar gained or lost by the government.4 However, it 
is treated this way in MDRC’s benefit-cost analyses because an appropriate approach that might 
be used instead is not apparent. 
Because of the shortcomings of the social perspective, this synthesis focuses mainly on 
the participant and government budget perspectives — although findings are reported for all 
three perspectives. By focusing on the participant and government budget perspectives, empha-
sis is put on situations in which conflicts occur because a program makes its participants better 
                                                 
4Boardman, Greenberg, Vining, and Weimer (2006), Chap. 18.  
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off but worsens the government’s budgetary position, or vice versa. In such instances, conclu-
sions about the efficacy of the program depend on value judgments, including judgments about 
the relative values of dollars gained and lost by program participants and the government and 
about what the goals of the program are. As the following chapters show, however, some 
programs produce net gains for both participants and the government.  
The Design of MDRC’s Welfare-to-Work Evaluations 
All the studies included in the synthesis used a random assignment research design. 
This rigorous methodology allows the effects of a program to be disentangled from the effects 
of other factors, such as the economy. Using this type of research design, individuals — usually 
single mothers receiving welfare — were assigned at random to a program group, which was 
subject to the welfare reforms, or to a control group, which was not. The groups were tracked 
over several years and compared on a number of outcomes, including employment, earnings, 
welfare receipt, and food stamp receipt. Government expenditures on behalf of both groups 
were tracked over several years as well. Because people were assigned to the groups at random, 
it can be assumed that, within each study, the groups did not differ systematically at the outset 
and went on to experience the same general economic and social conditions. Thus, any differ-
ences that emerged between the groups in the studies — for example, in people’s earnings or 
use of government benefits — can be reliably attributed to the programs that were studied. 
All the studies included in the synthesis used a similar benefit-cost methodology, which 
involved estimating costs and benefits over the five-year period following random assignment. 
The general approach was to focus on effects that are naturally expressed in dollars, such as 
earnings increases and public assistance payment decreases produced by the programs (calcu-
lated as the differences in outcomes between program group members and control group 
members), and to compare these estimates with estimates of the dollar value of the programs’ 
operating costs.  
Cost and Benefit Estimation Techniques 
Operating Costs 
As shown in Table 2.1, the major cost to the government in running welfare-to-work 
programs are operating outlays — that is, expenditures incurred in purchasing the services 
provided by programs.5 MDRC typically estimates these costs of programs by examining 
                                                 
(continued) 
5Operating costs include expenditures on instruction and materials, case management (for example, 
costs involved in counseling people about their barriers to work, helping people find jobs, enforcing time 
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them after they have reached a steady state (usually one or two years after a program is 
introduced). The number of program group members is divided into the total steady-state 
period’s operating costs to obtain an estimate of costs per program group member.  
“Operating cost per program group member” is a comprehensive measure of all the 
costs to the government of providing employment services and related support services to 
welfare recipients while they were enrolled in a welfare-to-work program as well as after they 
left the program and/or the welfare rolls. “Operating cost per control group member” is the 
corresponding estimate for the control group. These costs arise when members of the control 
group also receive services intended to encourage work. As is highlighted in Box 2.3, the 
measure of operating costs used in this report is the difference between program group and 
control group operating costs. In other words, the cost for the control group is the benchmark 
used to determine the additional per person operating cost engendered by the program being 
evaluated. 
Expenses incurred in providing job search, education, training, work experience, and 
work supplements — whether within welfare-to-work programs or when individuals seek out 
and participate in these activities on their own — as well as the costs of case management and 
support services, all contribute to operating costs. If substantial and similar proportions of 
program and control group members participate in high-cost activities, such as vocational 
training and postsecondary education, then it is likely that the costs for both groups will be high 
but that the difference in operating cost between the two groups — the measure used in the 
benefit-cost analysis — will be relatively small. In contrast, if most program group 
members participate in education and training activities and few control group members 
do so, then it is likely that the difference in operating costs between the two groups will be 
relatively large. 
Benefits 
As shown in Table 2.1, program benefits to participants typically include increases in 
earnings and fringe benefits, while benefits to the government typically include increases in tax 
payments that result from increases in participants’ earnings and decreases in welfare and food 
                                                 
limits, and assigning individuals to education or training programs or unpaid work experience jobs), and 
direct program expenditures on support services, such as child care and transportation. Reimbursements 
to program participants for their expenditures on child care or on transportation are also included. 
However, operating costs do not include program effects on transfer payments. In other words, they 
involve the purchases of real resources that, if not purchased as a result of a program, would be available 
for other purposes. 
11 
 Box 2.3 
How Are Benefits and Costs Measured? 
Benefits and costs are measured in this synthesis as differences in average outcomes between 
a program group and a control group. In other words, the control group benefits and costs are 
the benchmark used to determine the additional benefits and costs engendered by the pro-
gram being evaluated. 
stamp payments, Medicaid outlays, and the costs of administering transfer programs.6 Typical-
ly, MDRC directly measures program effects on earnings7 and welfare payments and then uses 
these estimates to infer program effects on fringe benefits and tax payments.8 Some MDRC 
studies also directly measure program effects on food stamps and Medicaid, but other studies 
infer them on the basis of estimates of program effects on earnings and welfare benefits. 
Program effects on the administrative costs of transfer programs are typically estimated using 
available administrative data on expenditures. 
Adjusting for Inflation9 
All the benefit and cost estimates appear in this report as they were calculated in the 
original studies. However, they have been adjusted to 2006 dollars using the Consumer Price 
Index to account for inflation, thereby providing a common dollar metric when comparing 
programs that operated in different time periods. (Box 2.4 describes how the Earned Income 
Tax Credit [EITC] has changed over time.) A shortcoming with the inflation adjustment is that 
there are some costs that have risen faster than inflation. Hence, programs with these types of 
costs will appear less costly than they would be in today’s economy. In particular, programs
                                                 
6Program effects on unemployment insurance (UI) benefits were estimated for some benefit-cost 
analyses but not for others. When estimated, this effect is usually small. When the effect was not 
estimated, the needed data might not have been available or the effect might have been expected to be 
small.  
7These studies typically use UI data to measure earnings. However, the evaluation of Canada’s Self-
Sufficiency Project (SSP) used survey data to measure earnings. UI data include the earnings from only 
those jobs that are in the UI system. Thus, the data do not include federal jobs or jobs in the informal 
labor market. Survey data include all jobs but may be subject to survey response bias, sampling bias, and 
lapses in respondents’ memories. 
8The studies assumed a take-up rate of between 70 percent and 100 percent for the EITC. The studies 
of the San Diego work experience program and the West Virginia CWEP program did not estimate EITC 
payments; however, EITC benefits were fairly small at the time that these studies were conducted. (See 
Box 2.4.)  
9Discounting is discussed below in this chapter. Inflation-adjusting adjusts for changes in the prices 
of goods over time, whereas discounting adjusts for the fact that goods received earlier in time are valued 
more highly than goods received later in time.  
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 Box 2.4 
How Has the Earned Income Tax Credit Changed Over Time? 
The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) has become more generous over time, especially for 
full-time workers. The figure below shows, over time, the annual EITC benefits for a single 
mother with two children who earns $6 per hour for part-time work (20 hours per week) and 
full-time work (40 hours per week). The EITC amounts in the figure have been adjusted for 
inflation. From 1990 to 1996, the inflation-adjusted credit increased for both part-time work 
and full-time work at a $6 per hour wage rate. From 1996 to 1998, the inflation-adjusted 
credit continued to increase for full-time work but at a slower rate than previously. Since 
1998, it has been stable. The nominal EITC for part-time work at a $6 per hour wage rate has 
remained constant since1996, but the inflation-adjusted EITC has declined. 
Tax payments in this synthesis reflect the tax rules and rates in effect at the time of each 
study. Since the EITC was more generous after 1990, benefit-cost analyses conducted after 
1990 may show greater benefits for participants than studies conducted prior to 1990. 
Welfare-to-Work Program Benefits and Costs
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with large health care and education costs would cost more to operate today than is reflected in 
the benefit-cost analyses. Readers are alerted throughout the report when education or health 
care costs were a major program component. However, while many programs in the synthesis 
included these types of costs, they were not a major component of most programs. 
Estimating Future Effects 
Almost all of MDRC’s benefit-cost analyses covered a five-year period after random 
assignment.10 However, because cost and benefit data were not available for this entire five-year 
time horizon for many of the programs, assumptions had to be made about what would happen 
to costs and benefits from the end of the period for which the data were available (the observa-
tion period) out to five years (the projection period).11 The lengths of the observation and 
projection periods vary by sample cohort. That is, sample members who were randomly 
assigned earlier will have a longer observation period and a shorter projection period than 
sample members who were randomly assigned later. The studies used different assumptions to 
estimate future effects because they typically based them on trends in the data from the observa-
tion period for each study. For details on the assumptions made in conducting the benefit-cost 
analyses for an individual study, see the final report for that study. (See References and Biblio-
graphy for a list of the evaluation reports used in this synthesis.)  
Discounting 
Because program benefits that are received in later years and costs that are paid in later 
years are of less value than similar amounts that are received or paid sooner, a 5 percent 
discount rate was used in all of MDRC’s benefit-cost studies to convert benefits to their present 
values. When total discounted costs are subtracted from total discounted benefits, the resulting 
value is called “net present value,” although this synthesis often uses the term “net value” for 
convenience. Use of a discount rate is standard practice in benefit-cost analysis. Because the 
                                                 
10The WRP and the SSP Applicant results were originally reported for a six-year time horizon. The 
WRP findings have been adjusted by the authors to a five-year time horizon. Appropriate information 
was not available to adjust the SSP Applicants study to a five-year time horizon, and thus the SSP 
Applicants benefit-cost analysis is shown in this synthesis as it appeared in the original study report.  
11The NEWWS, SWIM, WRP, and SSP Applicant studies had data for all sample members for five 
years, and thus all the effects of these programs are observed effects; there is no projection period. The 
length of the projection periods for the remaining studies are as follows: SSP Recipients, 0-8 months; 
Jobs First Connecticut, 0-12 months; FTP, 0-15 months; GAIN, 0-2 years; MFIP, 1-2.5 years; Project 
Independence, 2-3 years; West Virginia CWEP, 2.5-3.5 years; Los Angeles Jobs-First GAIN, 3 years; 
Cook County WIN Demonstration, 3-3.5 years; San Diego, 3-3.5 years. 
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time horizon is only five years long, the benefit-cost findings are fairly insensitive to the choice 
of a 5 percent discount rate.12 
Methodology Used for Calculating Return on Investment (ROI) 
The return on investment (ROI) per net dollar invested by the government is examined 
for each program and presented from all three perspectives (participant, government budget, 
and social). ROI estimates are popular with analysts and program operators because they 
provide a readily interpreted measure of the relative cost-effectiveness of different programs. 
Thus, they facilitate comparisons among programs. ROI ratios, which are often called “benefit-
cost ratios,” measure the benefits received for each dollar the government invested in programs. 
They are computed by dividing program benefits by program operating costs. As discussed 
above, the measures of program benefits and operating costs that are used in this report are 
computed as differences between the program group and the control group.  
ROI ratios are subject to several shortcomings that make them less useful (than net val-
ue) as a tool for program selection. First, the values of ROI ratios depend on exactly how 
“benefits” (the numerator) and “costs” (the denominator) are defined. In this report, program 
effects on earnings, taxes, and transfer payments always appear in the numerator, regardless of 
whether they are positive or negative, and only program operating costs appear in the denomi-
nator (but not in the numerator). Second, ROI ratios may not remain constant if the scale of a 
program changes. Thus, for example, two programs of different size but with the same ROI 
ratio are not necessarily equally cost-effective in all future cases, because the ROI ratios could 
either increase or decrease if the programs became more similar in size. Third, the ROI ratio 
may not make sense for all the program categories examined in this report. For instance, some 
earnings supplement programs resulted in savings in operating costs, and thus the return on 
investment would be measuring the return for every dollar saved rather than the return on each 
dollar invested. (In these situations, which are rare, the ROI ratio is not presented.) Because of 
these limitations, the ROI ratios are presented along with each program’s net value and its 
operating cost. This will help readers keep in mind the differences in program scale. 
Chapters 3 through 8 use the methodology described above to present and analyze ben-
efit-cost findings for six categories of welfare-to-work program approaches. 
 
12The formula for the present value is (Bt–Ct)/(1+d)t, where Bt and Ct are benefits and costs, respec-
tively, in year t, and d is the discount rate. Using this formula, the present value of a net gain of $1,000 
that was received during each of the five years after entering a welfare-to-work program would be $4,329 
at a discount rate of 5 percent and $3,791at a discount rate of 10 percent.  
  
Chapter 3 
Mandatory Work Experience Programs 
Unpaid work experience programs were tested following passage of the Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1981, which gave state welfare agencies greater freedom 
to plan and carry out their own employment initiatives for welfare recipients. States were 
permitted to operate work experience programs, in which welfare recipients who were not 
explicitly exempt from a welfare program participation requirement could be required to work 
in the public and nonprofit sectors in exchange for their welfare benefits; in the past, states had 
been allowed to run such programs only if they applied for special waivers.  
Although all the welfare-to-work programs included in this synthesis shared the goal of 
increasing the self-sufficiency of welfare recipients, sometimes recipients do not have the skills 
or experience that employers require. One method of attempting to make recipients more job-
ready is to increase their work experience through unpaid jobs, which usually are located at 
government agencies or nonprofit institutions. However, a key emphasis of mandatory work 
experience programs is on reducing welfare caseloads and the cost of welfare programs, in that 
unpaid work experience assignments might deter welfare recipients from staying on welfare. 
Many programs include unpaid work experience as one of several program components. 
However, the studies of the three programs examined in this chapter were designed in a way 
that allows the costs and benefits of unpaid work experience to be isolated.  
Both the Cook County Work Incentive (WIN) Demonstration and San Diego benefit-
cost analyses compared a group of welfare recipients who were required to participate in job 
search with a group who were also required to participate in job search but, if employment was 
not found while they were participating in job search, could then be assigned to an unpaid work 
experience position. This comparison allows the effects of work experience to be isolated — 
albeit for people who all first went through a job search “screen” — because random assign-
ment was used to allocate the welfare recipients to the two programs. Participation in work 
experience was limited to about three months. Notably, because the control group did receive 
services, the benefit-cost analyses described in this synthesis for these two programs compare 
two different program models — ones with and without work experience — rather than 
comparing these programs with a no-offered-services situation.1 
                                                 
1Both the Cook County WIN and the San Diego program were studied using a three-group random as-
signment design, which created a control group, a job-search-only group, and a job search/work experience 
group. Only the job-search-only group and the job search/work experience group are compared in this report.  
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The West Virginia Community Work Experience Program (CWEP) required welfare 
recipients to participate in a work experience position in exchange for their welfare benefits. 
Given the high level of unemployment in West Virginia at the time, individuals did not first go 
through job search; rather, they were initially assigned to work experience positions because it 
was thought that they were highly unlikely to find jobs and that the work performed in work 
experience positions could provide benefits to the state, as well as job experience to welfare 
recipients. The control group in the study of this program could not participate in CWEP. Both 
research groups were eligible for employment and training activities other than CWEP, but the 
availability of these services was limited in West Virginia. Thus, the benefit-cost analysis for 
the West Virginia program compares a program model that consisted almost entirely of work 
experience with something very close to a no-offered-services situation. 
Box 3.1 describes how the return on investment (ROI) is computed for each of the three 
benefit-cost perspectives used in this synthesis. 
Benefit-Cost Estimates 
The findings summarized in this chapter support the following conclusions regarding 
programs that include required unpaid work experience: 
• The emphasized goal of these work experience programs was to reduce wel-
fare expenditures, either by moving people quickly into the job market or by 
deterring them from remaining on welfare. Thus, the most salient perspective 
from which to assess these programs is the government perspective. From 
this perspective, two out of three of these programs resulted in small net 
losses, and one produced a modest net gain. 
• From the participant perspective, work experience programs produced small 
net gains or broke even.  
• Notably, these programs also provided an important benefit to society at 
large in the value of output produced at work experience jobs. As a conse-
quence, they all had positive net benefits from the social perspective. 
As shown in the middle panel of Figure 3.1, from the government budget perspective, 
two of the work experience programs (West Virginia CWEP and Cook County WIN) had net 
losses of under $400, and one program (San Diego) generated modest net gains. Table 3.1 
shows that West Virginia CWEP had operating costs that were greater than the savings in 
welfare payments, while the Cook County WIN Demonstration resulted in increases in welfare 
payments that were greater than the increases in tax revenue that it also generated. The San 
Diego program generated tax revenue increases and transfer program savings that, together, ex- 
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 Box 3.1 
How Is the Return on Investment (ROI) Computed 
for Each Perspective? 
Participant ROI 
These ratios are computed by dividing the net gain or loss that accrues to participants (from 
increases in earnings, fringe benefits, and taxes and from reductions in transfer payments) by 
program operating costs. For example, the ROI ratio of –0.32 for West Virginia CWEP, 
which is shown in Table 3.1, is computed by dividing the government’s operating cost of 
$505 into the participant net value of –$163. In this case, the ROI is negative because the net 
value for participants is negative. If participant income had increased, the ratio would have 
then been positive. The ratio for the West Virginia program implies that participants in the 
program were 32 cents worse off for every dollar the government invested. Notice that the 
participant ROI ratio measures the change in participant income per dollar invested in the 
program by the government, not by the participants themselves. 
Government Budget ROI 
These ratios are calculated by dividing the gain to government budgets (from increased tax 
revenues and savings in transfer program payments and associated administrative costs) by 
program operating costs. For example, the ratio of 0.35 for West Virginia CWEP was com-
puted by dividing the program’s operating costs ($505) into the government’s net value less 
its operating cost [–$328 – (–$505) = $177]. Subtracting the operating cost from the net value 
is necessary in order to expunge the numerator of the ROI ratio of program operating costs. 
As shown in Table 2.1, net benefits and net losses from the government budget perspective 
include operating costs. An ROI ratio in excess of 1 implies that the government’s return on 
its investment in a program was in excess of its cost, while a ratio of less than 1, such as in 
the case of West Virginia CWEP, means that it did not recoup its investment. In the West 
Virginia program, the government received 35 cents for each dollar it invested. 
Social ROI 
These ratios are computed by dividing the gain to society (measured as a program’s effect on 
earnings, fringe benefits, administration savings in operating transfer programs, and the value 
of output produced at work experience jobs) by program operating costs. Thus, the ratio of 
3.5 for West Virginia CWEP was computed by dividing the program’s operating costs ($505) 
into the social net gain resulting from the program less the program’s operating cost [–$1,261 
– (–$505) = $1,766]. Subtracting the operating cost from net benefits is necessary in order to 
expunge the numerator of the ROI ratio of program operating costs. As shown in Table 2.1, 
social net benefits and net losses include operating costs. Unless a program has negative 
effects on earnings or the control group had higher-cost services than the program group, the 
social ROI ratio must be positive. A value of greater than 1 implies that society has received 
more than a dollar back for each public dollar invested in the program, as is the case for West 
Virginia CWEP, but a ratio of less than 1 indicates that it did not. In the West Virginia pro-
gram, society received $3.50 for every dollar invested in the program. 
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Welfare-to-Work Program Benefits and Costs
Figure 3.1
Mandatory Work Experience Programs:
Five-Year Estimated Net Value per Program Group Member
(in 2006 dollars)
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ceeded the program’s operating costs, leading to a net benefit of $1,002 from the government’s 
perspective. The government’s ROI ratio ranged from –5.40 in Cook County to 8.17 in San 
Diego. The return to government from the Cook County WIN Demonstration was negative 
because transfer payments increased; as a consequence, the government spent an additional 
$5.40 for every dollar it invested in the program. However, program operating costs were very 
small, so the government did not, in fact, spend many additional dollars. In San Diego, the 
government received over $8 back for each dollar it invested. 
Though the emphasized goal implies that the government budget perspective should be 
used to assess mandatory work experience programs, it is still important to see how these 
programs affect participants. In general, work experience programs led to small net gains or 
were close to breaking even from the participant perspective. Participants in the Cook County 
WIN and San Diego programs experienced net gains because the earnings and fringe benefits of 
those who left the program for regular employment increased as a result of the program (that is, 
in comparison with those who were only required to participate in job search). The Cook 
County WIN Demonstration program was, in addition, the only work experience program to 
result in increased transfer payments.2 West Virginia CWEP was near the breakeven point from 
the participant perspective, even though earnings and welfare payments both fell. The return to 
participants per dollar invested by the government ranged from –0.32 to 12.40 (Table 3.1). 
Partially due to very low operating costs, the Cook County WIN Demonstration program 
generated $12.40 for participants for every dollar invested by the government. In general, all the 
work experience programs required only a small additional investment by the government in 
order to operate their work experience component. It should be kept in mind, however, that two 
of the work experience programs implemented the work experience component only for those 
who failed to find a job during an initial job search period.  
There is also an important potential benefit from work experience programs that accrues 
to neither program participants nor the government budget but to the whole of society: the value 
of the output produced at work experience jobs. The value of this output was estimated to be 
$1,752 per participant in West Virginia CWEP, $409 per participant in the San Diego program, 
and $182 per participant in the Cook County WIN Demonstration (not shown). The value is 
much larger in West Virginia than in the other two sites because a much larger proportion of the 
program group members were actually employed at work experience jobs and they remained in 
these jobs much longer. 
                                                 
2It is not clear why this was the case. While welfare payments were greater for the job-search-only group 
than for job search/work experience group in the Cook County WIN program, tests were not performed to 
determine whether this difference was statistically significant. The difference between the two program 
variants is fairly small and, hence, may not be statistically significant and may be due to sampling error, as 
opposed to being a real difference.  
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Welfare-to-Work Program Benefits and Costs
Table 3.1
Mandatory Work Experience Programs: 
Five-Year Estimated Operating Costs, Net Value, 
and ROI per Program Group Member
(in 2006 dollars)
Accounting Perspective
Government
Program Participant Budget Social
Cook County WIN Demonstration
Operating cost NA $57 $57
Net gain or net loss (net value) $707 -$365 $503
Return per net dollar invested by the government (ROI) 12.40 -5.40 9.82
San Diego
Operating cost NA $140 $140
Net gain or net loss (net value) $310 $1,002 $1,720
Return per net dollar invested by the government (ROI) 2.22 8.17 13.32
West Virginia CWEP
Operating cost NA $505 $505
Net gain or net loss (net value) -$163 -$328 $1,261
Return per net dollar invested by the government (ROI) -0.32 0.35 3.50
SOURCES: Published reports from the program evaluations. See References and Bibliography. 
NOTES: See Appendix Tables B.2, B.3, and B.4. 
See Box 3.1 for an explanation of how to calculate the ROI from each perspective.  
 
The three work experience programs reviewed in this chapter were generally success-
ful, or at least not highly unsuccessful, in achieving their emphasized goal of reducing welfare 
expenditures, as the programs either had small net gains or broke even from the government 
perspective. In addition, participants generally had small net gains or broke even. Furthermore, 
output of some value was produced on work experience jobs. The fact that the three reviewed 
work experience programs performed as well as they did may have been unanticipated. Howev-
er, their net gains were very small relative to the programs discussed in subsequent chapters. 
Moreover, unpaid work experience programs have a lower bar to cross to be beneficial from the 
government perspective because their operating costs are generally small. As was the case in the 
San Diego and Cook County programs, in today’s environment it would be likely that a work 
experience component would be added to other program features, and it would be unlikely for it 
to be the sole component of a welfare-to-work program (as it was in the West Virginia pro-
gram). 
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Chapter 4 
Mandatory Job-Search-First Programs 
Mandatory job-search-first programs require participation in job search activities upon 
entering the program. The goal is to make welfare recipients more self-sufficient and to move 
recipients into employment as quickly as possible, thereby reducing welfare expenditures. In 
addition, some policymakers and policy analysts think that any job, even a low-paying or 
temporary one, is the most cost-effective way to build skills that will lead to better jobs. 
Rigorous research in the early 1980s demonstrated that job-search-only programs sped 
up the entry of welfare recipients into the labor market. Typically, however, the jobs were 
neither long-lasting nor high-paying, and they did not increase family income. Furthermore, the 
programs generally did not benefit the most disadvantaged welfare recipients. In reaction to 
these findings, the five mandatory job-search-first programs that are included in this synthesis 
offered enhanced services that were designed to help even highly disadvantaged welfare 
recipients find jobs through organized group job clubs, supervised job search, enhanced job club 
classes, and greater knowledge of job openings resulting from job development activities 
conducted by program staff. 
Three of the five benefit-cost studies that are reviewed in this chapter were evaluated as 
part of the National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Strategies (NEWWS), which was mandated 
by the federal Family Support Act (FSA), and a fourth program analyzed in this chapter began 
after the passage of FSA as well.1 Enacted in 1988, FSA required the states to provide educa-
tion, employment, and support services to adults receiving cash welfare assistance, known at the 
time as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). Recipients of welfare were required 
to participate in the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training (JOBS) programs created under 
FSA. Many mandatory job-search-first programs continued to operate (with some modification) 
after passage of the 1996 federal welfare reform legislation, the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) because many of the goals, mandates, and 
program strategies first spelled out in FSA underpin PRWORA as well. 
FSA introduced some important new features to state welfare systems. Through its 
mandates and incentives, it encouraged state and local program administrators to serve welfare 
populations with whom they previously had had little contact and to experiment with new types 
of services, messages, and mandates. For the first time, for example, the majority of single-
                                                 
1The Saturation Work Initiative Model (SWIM) is the only program analyzed in this chapter that began 
before FSA. It operated in the mid to late 1980s. 
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parent AFDC recipients were required to work or engage in activities aimed at preparing them 
for work. This mandate included recipients with children as young as age 3 (or, at state discre-
tion, as young as age 1). In addition, FSA mandated that programs reserve at least 55 percent of 
federal welfare funds to provide services to welfare recipients who were deemed at greatest risk 
of long-term welfare dependency. FSA further required enrollees to participate in employment 
preparation activities for as long as they remained on AFDC. Case managers were expected to 
monitor recipients’ participation in program activities and to respond to nonparticipation by 
using a variety of informal and formal measures, including reductions of welfare grants. 
All five of the mandatory job-search-first programs that are included in this synthesis 
encouraged quick entry into work and strongly enforced the participation mandates, but the 
approach of each program was slightly different. The Atlanta Labor Force Attachment (LFA) 
NEWWS, Grand Rapids LFA NEWWS, and Riverside LFA NEWWS programs started 
individuals in job clubs and encouraged participants to find a job as quickly as possible. In 
addition, the Riverside LFA NEWWS program had full-time job developers to help place 
program enrollees in unsubsidized jobs. 
The Los Angeles Jobs-First GAIN (Greater Avenues for Independence) program 
strongly encouraged work. For example, caseworkers demonstrated to program participants 
that, by combining work and welfare, they could increase the income of their families. (This 
information was also available to members of the control group, but a special point was made of 
communicating it to program group members.) The program also provided high-quality job 
search assistance, an intensive orientation as to what was expected of program participants, and 
job developers who helped participants gain employment. Although the LA Jobs-First GAIN 
program did not operate under welfare time limits, staff warned participants that time-limited 
welfare was coming, and they urged them to get a job right away to preserve their eligibility for 
assistance. 
The Saturation Work Initiative Model (SWIM) involved a fixed sequence of activities 
that were intended to encourage work: two weeks in a job search workshop, followed by three 
months in unpaid work experience and a biweekly job club for participants who did not find a 
job while in the job search workshop. Finally, participants who had still not found employment 
by the end of their work experience obligation were referred to community-provided education 
and training. Operated as a demonstration program, SWIM thus presaged some of the program 
features encouraged by FSA. 
All five programs targeted both new welfare applicants and people who were already 
receiving welfare at the start of the study (referred to as “recipients”). However, the participa-
tion mandate for women with young children varied by program. SWIM required participation 
for welfare recipients with no children under age 6; the Atlanta LFA NEWWS, Riverside LFA 
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NEWWS, and Los Angeles Jobs-First GAIN programs required participation for welfare 
recipients with no children under age 3; and the Grand Rapids LFA NEWWS program required 
participation for welfare recipients with no children under age 1. 
The control groups in all five programs had no participation mandate and were not eli-
gible to receive the welfare-to-work services provided by the evaluated programs, but they 
could access services that were otherwise available in the community. All NEWWS control 
group members were barred from program services through Year 3, but in Years 4 and 5 some 
control group members were offered access to these services.2 Thus, the benefit-cost analyses 
for these five programs compared job-search-first programs with fairly long-term no-offered-
services situations. 
Benefit-Cost Estimates 
The findings summarized in this chapter support the following conclusions regarding 
mandatory job-search-first programs: 
• Mandatory job-search-first programs were intended to quickly reduce wel-
fare expenditures by getting participants into jobs. Inasmuch as the most em-
phasized goal was to reduce welfare expenditures, this synthesis views the 
government perspective as the most salient one to use in assessing these pro-
grams. From the government perspective, these programs usually resulted in 
substantial net gains and in a return on investment (ROI) greater than 1. 
• It was also hoped that mandatory job-search-first programs would eventually 
increase participants’ income as individuals gained experience in the labor 
market. However, from the participant perspective, these programs resulted 
at best in small net gains and at worst in substantial net losses. Although the 
earnings of participants increased as a result of these programs, this change 
was offset by reductions in the public assistance benefits they received. 
• As mentioned in Chapter 2, the social perspective is usually the sum of the 
participant and government perspectives. From the social perspective, man-
datory-job-search programs usually had net gains, but this is mostly a result 
of the substantial net gains to the government budget that they produced. 
As shown in the middle panel of Figure 4.1, from the government budget perspective, 
mandatory job-search-first programs were successful in achieving their emphasized goal: Four 
 
2The NEWWS evaluators determined that the control group’s exposure to welfare-to-work services in 
Years 4 and 5 had only a small effect, if any, on the program impacts. 
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out of the five mandatory job-search-first programs resulted in large net gains, but the Atlanta 
LFA NEWWS program resulted in net losses of –$932. All five programs resulted in savings in 
transfer payments, and most produced increases in tax revenues. Table 4.1 shows that the ROI 
ratio for the government ranges from 0.81 for the Atlanta LFA NEWWS program to 2.77 for 
the Los Angeles Jobs-First GAIN program, implying that, for every dollar it invested, the 
government recouped between 81 cents and $2.77. 
Though the government budget perspective reflects the most emphasized goal, manda-
tory job-search-first programs were also meant to increase participant income, at least over the 
longer run as employed former welfare recipients gained experience and skills. However, these 
programs resulted at best in small net gains for participants and at worst substantial net losses 
for participants. As shown in Figure 4.1, three programs produced small net gains in income for 
participants: Atlanta LFA NEWWS, SWIM, and Los Angeles Jobs-First GAIN. All five 
programs resulted in higher earnings and fringe benefits and in reductions in transfer payments. 
Benefits from the participant perspective were generated if participants were able to compensate 
for their losses of transfer payments with increases in earnings, fringe benefits, and Earned 
Income Tax Credit (EITC) payments. This did not occur in the case of the Grand Rapids LFA 
NEWWS and the Riverside LFA NEWWS programs. 
The returns to participants per dollar invested by the government (participant ROI ra-
tios) range from –1.13 in Grand Rapids to 0.49 in Los Angeles (Table 4.1), with the sign on the 
ratio dependent on whether participants had net gains or losses as a result of the program. Thus, 
depending on the program, participants lost as much as $1.13 or gained as much as 49 cents for 
every dollar invested by the government. 
Only two mandatory job-search-first programs had net gains from both the participant 
and the government budget perspective: LA Jobs-First GAIN and SWIM. In general, the 
mandatory job-search-first programs achieved the goal that they most emphasized, as they 
tended to result in net gains from the government budget perspective. However, these programs 
tended to make participants either only slightly better off or considerably worse off.  
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Welfare-to-Work Program Benefits and Costs
Table 4.1
Mandatory Job-Search-First Programs:
Five-Year Estimated Operating Costs, Net Value, 
and ROI per Program Group Member
(in 2006 dollars)
Accounting Perspective
Government
Program Participant Budget Social
Altanta LFA NEWWS
Operating cost NA $4,809 $4,809
Net gain or net loss (net value) $196 -$932 -$946
Return per net dollar invested by the government (ROI) 0.04 0.81 0.80
Grand Rapids LFA NEWWS 
Operating cost NA $2,405 $2,405
Net gain or net loss (net value) -$2,729 $3,521 $654
Return per net dollar invested by the government (ROI) -1.13 2.46 1.27
Los Angeles Jobs-First GAIN
Operating cost NA $1,721 $1,721
Net gain or net loss (net value) $837 $3,044 $3,552
Return per net dollar invested by the government (ROI) 0.49 2.77 3.06
Riverside LFA NEWWS 
Operating cost NA $4,018 $4,018
Net gain or net loss (net value) -$1,386 $1,870 $264
Return per net dollar invested by the government (ROI) -0.34 1.47 1.07
SWIM (San Diego)
Operating cost NA $1,692 $1,692
Net gain or net loss (net value) $234 $2,266 $2,549
Return per net dollar invested by the government (ROI) 0.14 2.34 2.51
SOURCES: Published reports from the program evaluations. See References and Bibliography. 
NOTES: See Appendix Tables B.5, B.6, and B.7.
See Box 3.1 for an explanation of how to calculate the ROI from each perspective. 
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Chapter 5 
Mandatory Education-First Programs 
Mandatory education-first programs usually require participation in education or train-
ing activities prior to job search activities. The theory is that individuals need to improve their 
skills first; then, when they look for work, they will be eligible for more jobs and for better jobs 
(that is, jobs with higher wages and more benefits). Like job-search-first programs discussed in 
Chapter 4, the goal of education-first programs is to get more recipients into work. Compared 
with job-search-first programs, however, more is initially invested in education-first program 
participants in the hope of reaping greater long-term benefits. 
All six of the mandatory education-first programs discussed in this chapter began after 
the federal Family Support Act (FSA) was passed in 1988, and they were all evaluated as part 
of the National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Strategies (NEWWS). In addition to the 
changes brought about by FSA that are discussed in Chapter 4, FSA also required states to 
provide new types of services to welfare recipients, including adult education — that is, high 
school or General Educational Development (GED) exam preparation classes, basic and 
remedial education, and English as a Second Language (ESL) classes. In addition, teenage 
custodial parents without a high school diploma or GED were required to return to classes to 
obtain one of these credentials. 
All six programs in this category required a skill-building activity at the beginning of 
participation in the program. The most common of these activities were GED preparation 
classes or Adult Basic Education (ABE). Program sample members could also participate in 
English as a Second Language (ESL), vocational training, or employment training classes. 
Despite their similar focus on skill-building, these six programs differed in the intensity 
of the message that they conveyed to participants and in the design of the programs. All the 
education-first programs emphasized taking part in skill-building prior to looking for a job. 
However, midway through the study period, clients in the Detroit program were required to 
participate in job search prior to skill training. In addition, in contrast to the other education-first 
programs, the Riverside Human Capital Development (HCD) program was limited to individu-
als without a high school diploma or GED or who had low reading and math literacy test scores. 
The programs also varied in the case management strategy that they followed. For in-
stance, the Columbus Integrated program is the only program in this category that had an 
integrated case management approach, whereby one case manager fulfilled both the duties 
related to benefit payments and the provision of employment-related services. In traditional case 
management, these duties are performed by separate case managers. Another difference among 
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the programs in this category is the level of enforcement of the participation mandate. The 
Detroit program can be characterized as only weakly enforcing the mandate. The Columbus 
Traditional, Columbus Integrated, and Grand Rapids HCD programs, in contrast, frequently 
invoked sanctions for nonparticipation by reducing welfare payments. The Atlanta HCD and 
Riverside HCD programs can both be characterized as high-enforcement programs. Further-
more, the participation mandate itself varied by program: The Atlanta HCD, Riverside HCD, 
Columbus Integrated, and Columbus Traditional programs required participation by welfare 
recipients with no children under age 3, whereas the Grand Rapids HCD and Detroit programs 
required participation by welfare recipients with no children under age 1. 
The control groups in the tests of all six programs did not have a participation mandate 
and were not eligible to receive the welfare-to-work services provided to the program group, but 
they could access services that were available in the community. All the NEWWS control group 
members were barred from welfare-to-work services through Year 3, but in Years 4 and 5 some 
control group members were offered access to welfare-to-work services.1 Thus, the benefit-cost 
analyses for these six programs compared education-first interventions with fairly long-term no-
offered-services situations. 
Benefit-Cost Estimates 
The findings summarized in this chapter support the following conclusions regarding 
mandatory education-first programs: 
• Mandatory education-first programs were intended to increase participants’ 
income, but not until after they had completed their course of study. As in-
creasing participants’ income was the most emphasized goal of these pro-
grams, the participant perspective seems to be the most salient one to ex-
amine. Mandatory education-first programs, which typically emphasized 
GED preparation classes or Adult Basic Education, did not achieve their goal 
of increasing participants’ income: These programs resulted in small net 
gains or in fairly substantial net losses from the participant perspective. Con-
sistent with the net values, the participant return-on-investment (ROI) ratios 
are either negative or, when positive, small. 
• From the government perspective, initial outlays were expected to be higher 
than for mandatory job-search-first programs, but savings — or at least break-
even situations — were hoped for in the long run. These programs usually 
                                                 
1The NEWWS evaluators determined that the control group’s exposure to welfare-to-work services in 
Years 4 and 5 had only a small effect, if any, on the program impacts.  
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resulted in small net losses or small net gains from the government budget 
perspective and large net losses from the social perspective. Consistent with 
the net values, most of the government and social ROIs are less than 1 in 
value, meaning that for every dollar invested, less than a dollar was returned. 
The benefit-cost estimates for the six education-first programs are shown in Figure 5.1. 
Benefit-cost estimates for Riverside HCD are included; however, this is the only education-first 
program that primarily limited program eligibility to welfare recipients who did not have a high 
school diploma or who had a high school diploma or GED but had low reading and math test 
scores. Thus, the Riverside HCD program served a more disadvantaged group of individuals 
who were likely to receive welfare for a relatively long period of time and participate in higher-
cost education services. 
Mandatory education-first programs emphasized increasing participants’ income after 
they finished their coursework. Yet these mandatory education-first programs, which typically 
emphasized GED preparation classes or Adult Basic Education, did not achieve the goal of 
increasing participants’ income. Net gains from the perspective of program participants were 
found for only the Atlanta HCD NEWWS and the Detroit NEWWS programs and, in both 
cases, by an amount of less than $600 (Figure 5.1). Even though program group members in 
most of the education-first programs increased their earnings and fringe benefits, their losses 
from reduced welfare receipts, food stamp receipts, and Medicaid availability usually exceeded 
their increase in earnings.2 Consistent with the net values, the ROI ratio was negative for 
participants in four of the programs and positive but close to zero for participants in the other 
two programs (Table 5.1). 
The lack of success of mandatory education-first programs in increasing the incomes of 
participants was surprising to many policymakers at the time the evaluations were conducted, 
because it was thought that a deficiency of human capital on the part of many welfare recipients 
was a key barrier to their success in the labor market. It is not entirely clear why these programs 
were not more successful in this respect. Most of the courses, however, were remedial in nature, 
and many participants did not achieve a level of skill mastery where they received a credential —
for example, a GED or a training certificate — that might have had a payoff in the labor market.  
                                                 
2As noted in Chapter 2, the MDRC benefit-cost studies included only benefits that occurred within five 
years after an individual was assigned to a welfare-to-work program. It is sometimes argued that the earnings 
effects of programs that provide education should persist for many years. However, one recent study found 
that, in the case of education-first welfare-to-work programs, earnings effects began to decline two or three 
years after initial program participation and fell to zero after five or six years (Greenberg, Ashworth, Cebulla, 
and Walker, 2004). 
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Welfare-to-Work Program Benefits and Costs
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Welfare-to-Work Program Benefits and Costs
Table 5.1
Mandatory Education-First Programs: 
Five-Year Estimated Operating Costs, Net Value,
and ROI per Program Group Member
(in 2006 dollars)
Accounting Perspective
Government
Program Participant Budget Social
Atlanta HCD NEWWS
Operating cost NA $6,632 $6,632
Net gain or net loss (net value) $569 -$3,943 -$3,545
Return per net dollar invested by the government (ROI) 0.09 0.41 0.47
Columbus Integrated NEWWS
Operating cost NA $5,062 $5,062
Net gain or net loss (net value) -$1,804 $295 -$1,680
Return per net dollar invested by the government (ROI) -0.36 1.06 0.67
Columbus Traditional NEWWS
Operating cost NA $4,565 $4,565
Net gain or net loss (net value) -$1,303 -$781 -$2,204
Return per net dollar invested by the government (ROI) -0.29 0.83 0.52
Detroit NEWWS
Operating cost NA $2,485 $2,485
Net gain or net loss (net value) $317 -$401 -$205
Return per net dollar invested by the government (ROI) 0.13 0.84 0.92
Grand Rapids HCD NEWWS
Operating cost NA $4,566 $4,566
Net gain or net loss (net value) -$2,370 -$374 -$2,816
Return per net dollar invested by the government (ROI) -0.52 0.92 0.38
Riverside HCD NEWWSa
No high school diploma or GED 
Operating cost NA $5,533 $5,533
Net gain or net loss (net value) -$3,571 $735 -$2,952
Return per net dollar invested by the government (ROI) -0.65 1.13 0.47
SOURCES: Published reports from the program evaluations. See References and Bibliography. 
NOTES: See Appendix Tables B.8, B.9, and B.10. 
See Box 3.1 for an explanation of how to calculate the ROI from each perspective.
aRiverside HCD NEWWS is not comparable to the other programs because of eligibility restrictions that 
limited the program sample to those who did not have a high school diploma or GED or who had low reading and 
math test scores.
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Moreover, those who were enrolled in the courses were required to take them, when they may 
have preferred not to. After all, many welfare recipients have not had especially successful 
experiences with the education system in the past.3 Thus, the findings for mandatory education-
first welfare-to-work programs obviously should not be extrapolated to represent the more 
intensive educational and vocational training courses in which individuals elect to participate. 
Although the participant perspective reflects the emphasized goal, mandatory educa-
tion-first programs hoped that the government would break even on these programs over time, 
by keeping those who enter employment from returning to the welfare rolls. Mandatory educa-
tion-first programs produced net gains from the perspective of the government budget for two 
of the six programs (Columbus Integrated and Riverside HCD NEWWS programs), but the net 
gains were fairly small (Figure 5.1). All six programs saved the government money by reducing 
welfare, food stamps, and Medicaid benefits, and five of the programs increased tax revenue. 
However, these programs were fairly expensive to operate (Table 5.1). Except for the Columbus 
Integrated and the Riverside HCD NEWWS programs, the transfer payment savings and 
increases in tax revenue were not sufficient to cover these costs. For two programs (Detroit 
NEWWS and Grand Rapids HCD NEWWS), the net loss per participant was less than $500 — 
close to breaking even from the government budget perspective. However, expenditures on 
education were a large part of the cost of these two programs, accounting for 80 percent and 58 
percent of operating costs, respectively, if basic education, postsecondary education, and 
vocational training costs are all counted. Their costs may be understated because the price of 
education has outpaced inflation. Consistent with the net value results, the government’s return 
on its investment was less than one dollar per dollar invested for all the education-first pro-
grams, except for the Columbus Integrated NEWWS and the Riverside HCD NEWWS pro-
grams (Table 5.1). 
Because education-focused programs are relatively costly to operate, they set a high bar 
in terms of the level of welfare, food stamps, and Medicaid payments that need to be saved for 
them to break even from the government budget perspective. From the participant perspective, 
increases in earnings and fringe benefits need to be fairly large to make up for losses in transfer 
payments. The Detroit NEWWS program was the only education-first program that produced 
net gains or at least came close to breaking even from both the participant and the government 
perspective; however, midway through its evaluation, this program became more similar to a 
job-search-first program than an education-first program. It was also, by far, the least expensive 
of the programs within the education-first category. 
 
3Notably, in the Atlanta, Grand Rapids, and Riverside NEWWS programs, only 8 percent of the study 
sample members stated at the time of random assignment that they wanted to go back to school to study 
reading and math; most preferred to get specific skills training (about 60 percent) or help in looking for a job 
(about 30 percent). See Gueron and Hamilton (2002). 
Chapter 6 
Mandatory Mixed-Initial-Activity Programs 
Mixed-initial-activity programs are a type of mandatory employment services program 
that varies the initial activity in which different individuals participate, usually on the basis of 
their personal characteristics. Upon program enrollment, individuals are assigned either to an 
education or training activity or to a job search activity, based on their needs. Those initially 
assigned to an education activity can later be assigned to job search, and those initially assigned to 
job search can later be assigned to an education or training activity if they do not find a job. 
Mixed-initial-activity programs were first initiated in reaction to programs that required 
welfare recipients to look for work that many states operated in the late 1970s or early 1980s. 
Although these job-search-only programs increased employment and reduced welfare spending, 
the employment gains were smaller for recipients who faced the most serious barriers.1 The eight 
mandatory mixed-initial-activity programs that are examined in this chapter began either a couple 
of years prior to or soon after the passage of the Family Support Act (FSA) of 1988. FSA, which 
is described in detail in Chapter 4, pushed states to target particularly disadvantaged recipients 
and to provide them with education or training that would build skills to make it easier for them to 
find jobs. 
The goal of the mixed-initial-activity programs is to move welfare recipients into work 
and make them less reliant on welfare. The mandatory mixed-initial-activity programs represent a 
compromise between two competing approaches to welfare reform: mandatory job search and 
mandatory education. Mandatory job search programs emphasize quick entry into the labor 
market and are intended to reduce dependency through employment and to offer opportunities for 
career advancement through gaining experience on the job.  Mandatory education programs, in 
contrast, emphasize increasing skills to expand employment opportunities; thus, in offering such 
programs, it is hoped that they will reduce long-term dependency by decreasing the rate at which 
former recipients return to welfare. By assigning some participants to training or education 
initially and others to job search initially, mixed-initial-activity programs seek to take the best of 
both approaches. (Chapters 4 and 5 discuss, respectively, mandatory job-search-first programs 
and mandatory education-first programs. Also see Boxes 6.1 and 6.2 at the end of this chapter.)  
The eight programs in the mixed-initial-activity category can be further categorized ac-
cording to their overall emphasis: Three of them were strongly employment-focused (Portland 
                                                 
1For a summary of these findings, see Gueron and Pauly (1991). 
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NEWWS, Project Independence, and Riverside GAIN),2 while the other five were more educa-
tion-focused. The creators of some of these latter programs may have decided to be more educa-
tion-focused to better serve the program’s target group; for instance, both Alameda GAIN and 
Los Angeles GAIN were education-focused — in part, because they drew their participants 
entirely from among long-term welfare recipients, a group that is more likely to be in need of 
basic education. In employment-focused mixed-initial-activity programs, staff urged participants 
to find work as soon as possible. Thus, the education or training activities were designed to be 
short term. In education-focused mixed-initial-activity programs, participants were allowed to 
enroll in education programs with less urgency attached to going to work. This latter distinction, 
though based on detailed studies of the programs’ implementation, is less clear-cut than distinc-
tions based on the initially assigned activity. 
All the mixed-initial-activity programs assigned participants either to education or to job 
search activities. However, the message delivered to them differed by program. Both the Portland 
NEWWS and the Project Independence program assigned most participants to a job search 
activity initially. Portland NEWWS assigned most participants to group job club first, while 
Project Independence assigned most of its participants to independent job search first, followed 
by a group job club for those who did not find employment. Portland NEWWS reserved General 
Educational Development (GED) preparation classes for those who were close to getting a GED 
certificate, while Project Independence reserved educational activities for those deemed “not job-
ready,” which the program defined as having less than a tenth-grade education and employment 
in fewer than 12 of the previous 36 months. Although Portland NEWWS was employment-
focused, the program encouraged participants to be selective in their job search and to wait for a 
“good” job. 
The six GAIN programs, which were run in six different counties in California, were 
unique in their use of educational and basic skill levels to sort participants into one of two service 
streams. Those who did not have a high school diploma (or a GED) or who failed to achieve 
predetermined scores on both parts of a math and reading test were deemed to be “in need of 
basic education.” These individuals could choose to attend a basic education class or a job search 
activity first; but, if they chose job search and failed to obtain employment, they were then 
required to enter basic education. Participants who were deemed “not to need basic education” 
usually were required to participate in job search first, although participants who were already 
enrolled in education or training activities at the time they were assigned to GAIN were usually 
allowed to continue in those activities. 
                                                 
2NEWWS = National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Strategies; GAIN = Greater Avenues for Indepen-
dence. 
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Although similar in certain respects, the six GAIN programs varied in what they empha-
sized. For instance, the staff of the strongly employment-focused Riverside GAIN program 
stressed that work was central and should be sought expeditiously and that offers of low-paying 
jobs should not be turned down (although participants in need of basic education were still 
allowed to opt for basic education), whereas the staff of the Alameda GAIN program encouraged 
participants to be selective about the jobs they took and to take advantage of the education and 
training the program offered so as to prepare themselves for higher-paying jobs. The GAIN 
programs in Butte, Los Angeles, San Diego, and Tulare took approaches falling between those of 
the Riverside and Alameda programs but were generally closer to Alameda’s philosophy. 
The control groups in all eight benefit-cost studies were not eligible for program services 
and were not subject to a participation mandate, but they could seek out services available 
elsewhere in the community.3 The control groups varied in terms of how long they were not 
eligible for program services, ranging from as little as two years following random assignment for 
the study of the Project Independence program to five years for the study of the Portland 
NEWWS program. Thus, the benefit-cost analyses for these eight programs compare mandatory 
mixed-initial-activity programs with fairly long-term no-offered-services situations, similar to the 
situation for the programs in the job-search-first and education-first categories (Chapters 4 and 5). 
Notably, the target populations of three of these programs were different from the popula-
tions of other mixed-initial activity programs and, thus, may exhibit different cost-benefit results. 
In both Alameda and Los Angeles GAIN, all those enrolled were long-term welfare recipients. In 
contrast, 88 percent of Project Independence sample members were applicants or re-applicants 
(that is, persons previously on welfare and reapplying for benefits). These differences in sample 
population should be kept in mind when looking at the results. 
Benefit-Cost Estimates 
The findings summarized in this chapter support the following conclusions regarding 
mandatory mixed-initial-activity programs: 
                                                 
3Contrary to the research design, some Project Independence control group members participated in em-
ployment-related activities through Project Independence. It was estimated that nearly 8 percent of control group 
members attended orientation and participated in some employment-related activities, mostly independent job 
search, through Project Independence (Kemple, Friedlander, and Fellerath, 1995). An additional 12 percent of the 
control group attended orientation or were referred for a sanction for not attending orientation but did not 
participate in Project Independence employment-related services. In all, up to an estimated 20 percent of the 
control group were exposed to some aspect of Project Independence. The cost of these services was included as 
part of the control group operating costs.  
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• Mandatory mixed-initial-activity programs attempted to balance a need for fis-
cal responsibility with an effort to tailor services to participants’ individual 
needs. Thus, these programs are best judged from the perspectives of both the 
government budget and the participants. Six of the programs in this category 
enrolled both short-term and long-term welfare recipients, and, in general, 
these six programs achieved their goal: With a few exceptions, they were cost-
beneficial for the government and participants. The remaining two programs in 
this category limited participation to long-term welfare recipients and did not 
produce the positive results usually found for the other six mixed-initial-
activity programs. 
Some of the eight mixed-initial-activity programs produced net gains, and some resulted 
in net losses from the participant perspective. As shown in Figure 6.1, the net value ranges from a 
loss of $2,178 to a gain of $2,651. Portland NEWWS and Project Independence had net losses for 
participants of less than $1,000,4 but in Los Angeles GAIN the net losses were over $2,000. 
Participants in the remaining five mixed-initial-activity programs enjoyed net gains, which ranged 
from $1,323 to $2,651. All the mixed-initial activity programs caused transfer payment reduc-
tions, but participants did not always have earnings and fringe benefit gains that were large 
enough to offset these losses in transfer payments. Consistent with the net value estimates, the 
return on investment (ROI) for participants ranged from a loss of 32 cents for each dollar that the 
government spent to a gain of $1.19 (Table 6.1). The two programs that targeted long-term 
welfare recipients had mixed results: Alameda GAIN showed a net gain for participants, whereas 
Los Angeles GAIN showed a net loss for participants. Four of the remaining six programs 
showed net gains, and the other two programs showed small net losses. In general, mandatory 
mixed-initial-activity programs were successful in increasing participant income. 
From the government budget perspective, three mixed-initial-activity programs produced 
net gains (Portland NEWWS, Riverside GAIN, and San Diego GAIN); two more or less broke 
even (Project Independence and Butte GAIN each had net gains of $100 or less); and three 
resulted in net losses (Alameda GAIN, Los Angeles GAIN, and Tulare GAIN). The three pro-
grams with net losses from the government budget perspective were comparatively highly 
education-focused. However, one of the programs that broke even and one of the programs with 
net gains were also education-focused. The two programs with net gains of over $4,000 were both 
employment-focused. Two of the programs with large net losses — Alameda GAIN and Los 
Angeles GAIN — were very costly programs (Table 6.1) because, relative to the other GAIN 
                                                 
4The net loss for Portland was in part due to large reductions in eligibility for Medicaid that resulted from 
increases in employment. Portland had a large difference between the program group and the control group in 
number of months of welfare receipt — and therefore also a large difference in the length of Medicaid receipt, 
which resulted in large reductions in Medicaid. 
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Figure 6.1
Mandatory Mixed-Initial-Activity Programs:
Five-Year Estimated Net Value per Program Group Member
(in 2006 dollars)
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SOURCES: Published reports from the program evaluations. See References and Bibliography.
NOTES: See Appendix Tables B.11, B.12, and B.13.
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Table 6.1
Mandatory Mixed-Initial-Activity Programs:
Five-Year Estimated Operating Costs, Net Value, 
and ROI per Program Group Member (in 2006 dollars)
Accounting Perspective
Government
Program Participant Budget Social
Butte GAIN
Operating cost NA $4,053 $4,053
Net gain or net loss (net value) $2,210 $77 $2,026
Return per net dollar invested by the government (ROI) 0.55 1.02 1.50
Portland NEWWS
Operating cost NA $3,467 $3,467
Net gain or net loss (net value) -$745 $6,337 $5,169
Return per net dollar invested by the government (ROI) -0.22 2.83 2.49
Riverside GAIN
Operating cost NA $2,229 $2,229
Net gain or net loss (net value) $2,651 $4,096 $6,221
Return per net dollar invested by the government (ROI) 1.19 2.84 3.79
San Diego GAIN
Operating cost NA $2,668 $2,668
Net gain or net loss (net value) $1,323 $1,069 $2,303
Return per net dollar invested by the government (ROI) 0.50 1.40 1.86
Tulare GAIN
Operating cost NA $3,815 $3,815
Net gain or net loss (net value) $2,201 -$3,154 -$1,143
Return per net dollar invested by the government (ROI) 0.58 0.17 0.70
Project Independence (Florida) 
Applicants and reapplicants
Operating cost NA $1,605 $1,605
Net gain or net loss (net value) -$515 $100 -$479
Return per net dollar invested by the government (ROI) -0.32 1.06 0.70
Alameda GAIN
Long-term welfare recipients 
Operating cost NA $7,811 $7,811
Net gain or net loss (net value) $1,521 -$4,260 -$2,935
Return per net dollar invested by the government (ROI) 0.19 0.45 0.62
Los Angeles GAIN
Long-term welfare recipients 
Operating cost NA $8,079 $8,079
Net gain or net loss (net value) -$2,178 -$4,803 -$7,042
Return per net dollar invested by the government (ROI) -0.27 0.41 0.13
(continued)
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Table 6.1 (continued)
SOURCES: Published reports from the program evaluations. See References and Bibliography. 
NOTES: See Appendix Tables B.11, B.12, and B.13.
See Box 3.1 for an explanation of how to calculate the ROI from each perspective.  
Target populations differed for three programs and thus may exhibit different cost-benefit results: Alameda 
and Los Angeles GAIN programs were limited to those who were long-term welfare recipients. Project 
Independence targeted mostly applicants or reapplicants.
programs, much larger investments were made in education and training. (Education and training 
costs ranged from 1 percent to 69 percent of the government’s total investment for the eight 
mixed-initial activity programs, with the employment-focused Project Independence program’s 
costs being surprisingly at 68 percent.) Consequently, very large transfer payment savings and tax 
revenue increases would have been required in order for these programs to break even from the 
government budget perspective. Furthermore, both of these programs restricted program eligibili-
ty to long-term welfare recipients, which may have made it more difficult for the programs to 
generate the needed benefits. 
As shown in Table 6.1, the ROI from the government budget perspective was consistent 
with the government’s net value for each program. Both programs that targeted long-term welfare 
recipients showed sizable net losses for the government budget. Five of the remaining six pro-
grams showed net gains (although, for two of these programs, the net gain was so small that it 
might be better characterized as breaking even). In general, mandatory mixed-initial-activity 
programs were successful at reducing welfare expenditures. 
In summary, mandatory mixed-initial-activity programs were often, but not always, bene-
ficial from the participant perspective and the government budget perspective. Hence, they are 
generally successful in meeting their emphasized goal of balancing reductions in welfare costs 
and increases in participant income. 
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Box 6.1 
What Type of Mandatory Employment Program Is Most Beneficial for 
Those with Low Levels of Education? 
For Those with High Levels of Education? 
At the time that NEWWS was conducted, there was some thought that different types of 
mandatory employment programs may be more beneficial for welfare recipients with different 
levels of education. For example, proponents of education-first programs argued that these 
programs were most appropriate for the recipients who lacked a high school diploma or Gener-
al Educational Development (GED) certificate or who faced other barriers to employment 
because these programs offered the best chance of helping such persons get better and more 
stable jobs, increase their family’s income, and stay off the welfare rolls. It was also thought 
that job-search-first programs, in contrast, might be more appropriate for the welfare recipients 
who have a high school diploma or GED. Inasmuch as the research design in three of the 
NEWWS sites (Atlanta, Grand Rapids, and Riverside) facilitated head-to-head tests of educa-
tion-first and job-search-first programs in the same site, subgroup analyses from these three 
NEWWS sites, combined with subgroup analyses from the other NEWWS sites, provide the 
clearest answer to the question of which of these two approaches works better for whom. 
Net values are shown separately below for the participants in the NEWWS programs who had 
a high school diploma or GED at study entry and those who did not have these credentials at 
study entry. The following conclusions can be drawn from the NEWWS study: 
1. There is no evidence from NEWWS that participants without a high school diploma or 
GED were better off in education-first programs than in job-search-first programs. On-
ly Portland, a mixed-initial-activity program, seemed to work well for them. 
2. There is no evidence from NEWWS that participants with a high school diploma or 
GED were better off in job-search-first programs than in education-first programs. On-
ly Atlanta HCD, an education-first program, seemed to work well for them (although 
Atlanta LFA and Detroit also produced very small net gains for these persons). 
3. There is no evidence from NEWWS that it is more cost-beneficial to the government to 
place welfare recipients who lack a high school diploma or GED in education-first pro-
grams. From the government budget perspective, net gains appear to be at least as large 
when such individuals are placed in job-search-first or mixed-activity-programs as 
when they are placed in education-first programs. 
4. There is evidence from NEWWS that it is more cost-beneficial to the government to 
place welfare recipients who have a high school diploma or GED in job-search-first 
programs (or mixed-activity programs). Net gains to the government budget fail to oc-
cur when such individuals are placed in education-first programs. 
(continued) 
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Box 6.1 (continued) 
Mandatory Employment Services for Education Subgroups 
Five-Year Estimated Net Value per Program Group Member
from the NEWWS Evaluation (in 2006 dollars)
SOURCES: Pubished reports from the program evaluations.  See Appendix B for full citations.
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Box 6.2 
Is It Worthwhile to Fund Adult Education in 
Welfare-to-Work Programs? 
The welfare-to-work programs that are reviewed in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 attempted to make 
single parents who were receiving welfare less dependent on government benefits by increas-
ing their earnings through mandatory employment services. All these programs provided 
remedial education and vocational training services to at least those welfare recipients who did 
not first find jobs through job search activities. 
In a recent paper, Heckman and Masterov* argue that the funds expended on such programs 
(and more generally on public job training) would be better spent on early-intervention pro-
grams targeted at children while they are still very young. As evidence, they point in particular 
to benefit-cost studies of two enriched preschool programs that targeted children from disad-
vantaged families, the Perry Preschool Experiment and the Chicago Child-Parent Center and 
Expansion Program. The social ROI ratios for these two programs were estimated to be 9.11 
and 7.77, respectively.† Thus, society reaped around $8 or $9 for every dollar invested in these 
programs. Many of the mandatory employment service programs described in Chapters 4 
through 6, in contrast, had ROI ratios of less than 1, implying a return of less than a dollar for 
each dollar invested. Even the more successful of these programs from the social perspective 
(for example, SWIM, the Los Angeles Jobs-First program, Portland NEWWS, and Riverside 
GAIN) had social ROI ratios of around 3, which are still well below the ratios for the two 
enriched preschool pro-grams. 
Keeping in mind that not all the benefits and costs of welfare-to-work programs were measured 
in MDRC’s studies (see Chapter 2), it is instructive to ask why the programs that were aimed at 
disadvantaged young children have larger ROI ratios than even the most cost-beneficial of the 
mandatory employment services programs targeted at adult welfare recipients. One of the most 
important reasons is that program benefits accrue over a much longer time for programs in 
which children participate. This is both because children obviously have more years of life 
ahead of them than adults and because the effects on earnings of programs tar-geted at welfare 
recipients typically do not persist for more than half a decade or so.‡ Another important reason 
is that two of the more important benefits resulting from the Perry and Chicago enriched 
preschool programs were reductions in crime and reductions in the costs of education when the 
participating children became older because of less need for special education and grade repeti-
tion. If these benefits had not occurred, the social ROI ratio for the Perry and the Chicago 
programs would have fallen to 2.86 and 5.06, respectively, which is more similar to the ratios 
for the more successful mandatory employment services programs. Although neither 
NOTES: *Heckman and Masterov (2005). 
†Heckman and Masterov (2005), Table 7. 
‡Greenberg, Ashworth, Cebulla, and Walker (2004). 
(continued)
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 Box 6.2 (continued) 
of these benefits was measured in any of the studies included in the synthesis, it seems implaus-
ible that they are very large for programs in which most of the participants are welfare mothers. 
It should be pointed out that, in addition to the obvious differences in target groups, the Perry 
and Chicago programs and their evaluations differ in other key respects from the mandatory 
employment services programs reviewed in this synthesis. First, the former are voluntary 
programs, and the latter are mandatory. Second, the evaluations of mandatory employment 
programs are all based on random assignment, but the Chicago program was evaluated using a 
nonexperimental matching procedure, which provides less reliable estimates of program ef-
fects. Third, although the evaluation of the Perry program was based on random assignment, 
the sample size was very small (a program group of 58 persons and a control group of 65). The 
evaluations of the mandatory employment programs, in contrast, typically relied on samples of 
well over a thousand welfare recipients. Larger samples usually provide more reliable findings. 
For example, the large benefits from reductions in crime were found for the Perry program 
because just a few more members of the Perry control sample were incarcerated than members 
of the Perry program sample.§ Fourth, most welfare recipients who were otherwise eligible in 
the welfare offices where the mandatory employment programs were tested were subjected to 
the mandate (a relatively small number were instead assigned to the control group). It is not 
clear that if the Perry program were operated at a similarly large scale, its social ROI ratio 
would be as large as the one that was estimated. Head Start is a very large-scale program for 
disadvantaged preschool children, and although a recent study|| of the benefits and costs of 
Head Start argues persuasively that its social ROI ratio is probably above 1, the study does not 
estimate the size of the ratio. 
Thus, there is some uncertainty as to whether ROI ratios for large-scale programs that are 
targeted at preschool children from disadvantaged families are really in the range of 8 or 9. 
Even if they are, however, this does not necessarily imply that mandatory employment service 
programs for welfare recipients, which are unlikely to ever approach this level, should not be 
funded. If funding for these programs did cease, it is not at all clear that the savings would be 
invested in programs for preschool children. In fact, even if this did occur, the additional 
funding that would be available for programs for preschool children would not go very far, as 
the costs per participant in the Perry and the Chicago programs were around $17,670 and 
$8,280 in 2006 dollars, respectively, while the per participant operating cost of most of the 
mandatory employment programs included in this synthesis were less than $5,000. However, 
there is little point in investing in mandatory employment programs that do not have net gains. 
Thus, it is logical that mandatory employment service programs that are highly cost-beneficial 
be replicated to the extent possible. By providing benefit-cost findings from rigorous evalua-
tions based on random assignment, this report identifies several programs of this sort. The 
evaluation studies that are listed in this report’s References and Bibliography detail how these 
programs were designed and how they were run in the field. 
NOTES: §Cook (2007). 
||Ludwig and Phillips (2007). 
45 
  
Chapter 7 
Earnings Supplement Programs 
Work alone is often insufficient to make participants in welfare-to-work programs bet-
ter off. Partly for this reason, state and federal governments began to experiment in the 1990s 
with various kinds of earnings supplements. Indeed, the goal of most earnings supplement 
programs is to encourage work and, at the same time, to ensure that those participants who take 
jobs increase their incomes. Thus, these programs require work in exchange for receiving a 
supplement. 
Earnings supplement programs differ from all the other programs included in this syn-
thesis because there is no expectation that these programs will necessarily result in savings for 
the government. By design, they are likely to increase the dollars that the government transfers 
to welfare recipients. However, the government is clearly interested in operating these programs 
as efficiently as possible — in other words, in producing the greatest gains for the lowest cost. 
This chapter describes the results from several random assignment evaluations of pro-
grams that isolated the effects of earnings supplements by randomly assigning welfare recip-
ients to two groups, only one of which was eligible for the supplements. Otherwise, except for 
certain changes in the welfare rules discussed below — which were applied only to those 
eligible for the earnings supplements — the two groups were treated identically. These results 
are important because they indicate the benefits and costs that states can expect to result from 
providing earnings supplements on top of other program components. In addition, because the 
national Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) has many of the same features as the earned income 
disregards1 found in many states, the results may afford a rough sense of the costs and benefits 
of the EITC. For example, like the EITC, earnings supplements are reduced as earnings rise, 
once they exceed a specified level. 
This chapter focuses on the effects of three earnings supplement programs: a variant of 
the Minnesota Family Investment Program (MFIP) called “MFIP Incentives Only;”2 a variant of 
Vermont’s Welfare Restructuring Project (WRP) called “WRP Financial Incentives Only;” and 
                                                 
1Welfare payments generally are reduced as a recipient’s earnings rise. However, some earnings may be 
disregarded (that is, not counted) in determining welfare benefits. Each dollar of benefits that is counted (not 
disregarded) reduces welfare benefits by one dollar. 
2This report focuses on MFIP Incentives Only results for single-parent urban recipients.  
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the Self-Sufficiency Project (SSP) Applicant and Recipient programs, which were tested in 
Canada.3 
The SSP program delivered earnings supplements outside the regular welfare system. 
Indeed, participants could not receive payments through the regular Canadian welfare system 
while they were receiving SSP supplement payments. The SSP earnings supplement was 
available only to single parents who had been on income assistance for at least one year and 
who left income assistance for full-time work. To receive the SSP supplement, participants had 
to work at least 30 hours a week and remain off income assistance. They were then eligible to 
receive the earnings supplement for three years. The SSP program was similar for applicants 
and recipients. Differences between the SSP Recipient Study and the SSP Applicant Study 
reflect three factors: (1) the different target populations, (2) the timing of when the program 
groups could get the supplements (recipients could receive them when the study began, but 
supplements were unavailable for an initial year for applicants), and (3) sampling error (the 
results are much more positive for applicants, but much of this appears to be a statistical fluke). 
In contrast, both MFIP and WRP delivered earnings supplements through the regular 
welfare system by changing the welfare rules so that work was rewarded more than it was under 
the existing regulations. Specifically, these rule changes reduced the rate at which welfare 
payments fell as earnings increased. Both programs also increased the asset limit at which 
individuals ceased being eligible for welfare benefits. This meant that welfare recipients could 
accumulate more savings from earnings without losing their eligibility for assistance and could 
own a more valuable (and hence more reliable) car. 
Both programs also made other changes to welfare rules that were beneficial to program 
members. For instance, MFIP streamlined some of the welfare and food stamp eligibility rules 
in a manner that was beneficial to participants, and it paid the cost of child care directly to the 
provider (rather than having the participant first pay it and then be reimbursed). Because MFIP 
budgeted retrospectively, the first two months of earnings after starting a job were not counted 
against the MFIP grant; conversely, if a participant lost a job, the MFIP grant was immediately 
increased. WRP changed the process used in collecting child support payments from noncus-
todial parents on the behalf of children receiving assistance in order to make the payments more 
visible to the custodial parents. It also expanded support for families who left welfare for work, 
by providing three years of transitional Medicaid coverage and transitional child care assistance 
                                                 
3Employment incentives were the main focus of the SSP evaluation. MFIP Incentives Only and WRP 
Incentives Only were not the sole focus of the evaluations in Minnesota and Vermont; full MFIP and full 
WRP, which included services in addition to financial incentives, were also evaluated. However, although 
findings from full MFIP are discussed in Box 7.2, this synthesis focuses mainly on research group comparisons 
that were specifically designed to isolate the effects of financial incentives.  
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on a sliding scale to families whose incomes did not exceed 80 percent of the state median. The 
rules in the absence of WRP provided only one year of both types of transitional benefits. 
However, the financial incentives provided by the WRP program were not very differ-
ent from those that existed in the absence of the program. In fact, at most levels of earnings, the 
“enhanced” earnings disregard during the first four months of work was actually somewhat less 
generous. Beginning in the fifth month of employment, however, WRP’s disregard became 
somewhat more generous (unless the parent earned $120 per month or less, in which case there 
was no difference between the two sets of rules). 
Box 7.1 compares the earnings supplement programs included in the synthesis by 
showing the monthly increase in income from each of the earnings supplement programs for a 
typical sample member who worked part time and a typical sample member who worked full 
time. SSP was by far the most generous to full-time workers, and MFIP was the most generous 
to part-time workers. The earnings supplement provided by WRP was small, and, as mentioned 
above, a typical sample member would receive less under WRP than under the regular rules for 
the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program during the first four months of 
employment. Both the MFIP and the WRP earnings supplements paid more to part-time 
workers than to full-time workers. 
The control groups for all three programs were not subject to any participation man-
dates and were not eligible to receive earnings supplements, but they were still eligible for 
assistance under the existing rules. The studies varied in terms of how long the difference in 
treatment of program group and control group members was maintained, ranging from as little 
as two years following random assignment for MFIP4 to six years for the WRP program. Thus, 
the benefit-cost analyses for these four programs compare persons eligible for earnings supple-
ments with a control group that was not eligible for earnings supplements. 
Benefit-Cost Estimates 
The findings summarized in this chapter support the following conclusions regarding 
earnings supplement programs: 
• A major goal of the earnings supplement programs was to improve the finan-
cial situation of participants while encouraging them to work. Thus, the par- 
                                                 
4In June 1998, MFIP and control group members became subject to the same statewide welfare policy, 
which provided a less generous earnings disregard for those in the program group but a more generous 
earnings disregard in the control group. June 1998 was 16 quarters following random assignment for the 
earliest group randomly assigned and was 9 quarters following random assignment for the last group randomly 
assigned. 
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 Box 7.1 
Increase in Monthly Income due to Supplement 
Program Part Time Full Time
MFIP $250 $150
SSP $0 $450
WRP (Months 1-4) -$6 -$24
WRP (Months 5-12) $67 $16
Notes: The calculations assume a wage of $6.00 per hour in U.S. dollars.
Part time is 20 hours per week. Full time is 40 hours per week for MFIP
and SSP and 35 hours per week for WRP.
Hours per Week Worked
 
ticipant perspective is particularly pertinent in assessing this type of program. 
Based on this perspective, earnings supplement programs perform well. 
Among the program categories included in this synthesis, earnings supple-
ment programs produced the largest net gains for participants. 
• Earnings supplement programs differ from all the other programs included in 
this synthesis because there was no expectation that these programs would 
result in savings for the government, at least in the short run. By design, they 
were likely to increase the dollars that the government transfers to welfare 
recipients. As expected, these programs showed net losses from the govern-
ment budget perspective. 
• Among the earnings supplement programs, only one resulted in a net loss 
from the social perspective, and this loss was modest. Inasmuch as the social 
perspective is the sum of the participant and government perspectives, these 
rather positive results are driven by the large net gains to participants. They 
suggest that earnings supplement programs are an efficient mechanism for 
transferring income to low-income families. Most transfer programs, in con-
trast, cost the government more than a dollar for each dollar increase in the 
incomes of recipients. 
A major goal of the earnings supplement programs was to improve the financial situa-
tion of participants. As expected and as shown in Figure 7.1, earnings supplement programs 
result in net gains from the participant perspective and net losses from the government budget 
perspective. The values differ by program and are driven by the generosity of the earnings 
supplement and by the extent to which programs were successful in encouraging work (and thus 
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Welfare-to-Work Program Benefits and Costs
Figure 7.1
Earnings Supplement Programs:
Five-Year Estimated Net Value per Program Group Member
(in 2006 dollars)
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in increasing earnings).5 WRP produced only small net gains from the participant perspective, 
which is not surprising, because the financial payments were not much greater than those 
existing under the regular welfare rules. In contrast, the other earnings supplement programs 
resulted in large net gains from the participant perspective and large net losses from the gov-
ernment budget perspective. Because the cost-benefit studies included in this synthesis assume 
that program benefits continued to exist for only five years, the net gains of participants would 
be even larger than those implied by Figure 7.1 if, as a result of job experience gained while 
receiving earnings supplements, program effects on earnings continued beyond this period. 
Unfortunately, however, while those who implemented these programs hoped that this would be 
the case, it was not. Program earnings effects diminished over time, reaching zero before or just 
after the end of the five-year period.6 
As shown in Figure 7.1, the net gains received by participants were either larger or only 
slightly smaller than the government’s net losses. This implies that earnings supplements are a 
relatively efficient means of transferring income to low-income persons. Most welfare pro-
grams, such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) or TANF, are much less 
efficient because they create incentives for welfare recipients to work less. As a consequence, 
their earnings fall. Thus, in order to increase the incomes of recipients by a dollar, the govern-
ment must transfer considerably more than a dollar. This is much less likely in the case of 
earnings supplement programs because the supplements usually increase as earnings rise, 
thereby providing an incentive to work more. 
As noted earlier, SSP operated outside the regular welfare system. As a consequence, its 
operating costs were substantial. Because MFIP and WRP provided earnings supplements by 
simply changing the benefit computation formulas in the existing welfare system and because 
they resulted in small reductions in participation in employment-related activities, they actually 
resulted in small reductions in operating costs. Return-on-investment (ROI) ratios are not 
readily interpretable if the denominator in the ratio (program operating costs) is negative. Thus, 
ROI ratios are presented for only the SSP program (Table 7.1). 
                                                 
5Another important earnings supplement program, the New Hope demonstration, was not included in this 
synthesis because a full five-year cost-benefit analysis was not completed and the study did not isolate the 
effect of its earnings supplement. The New Hope program provided an earnings supplement, subsidized health 
insurance, and subsidized child care, which were conditioned on participants’ having full-time work. However, 
the program also provided a wage-paying community service job to participants who wanted to work full time 
but were unable to find a full-time job. The results of the two-year cost benefit analysis for New Hope are 
consistent with those for the earnings supplement programs in this synthesis: The program resulted in net gains 
from the participant perspective and net losses from the government perspective. New Hope also resulted in net 
losses from the social perspective (Bos et al., 1999). Furthermore, a discussion of five-year costs and benefits 
for a subset of New Hope sample members — those with children age 1 through 10 at baseline — concludes 
that there were net losses from the social perspective (Duncan, Huston, and Weisner, 2007). 
6For a detailed analysis, see Michalopoulos (2005). 
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 Welfare-to-Work Program Benefits and Costs
Table 7.1
Earnings Supplement Programs: 
Five-Year Estimated Operating Costs, Net Value, 
and ROI per Program Group Member
(in 2006 dollars)
Accounting Perspective
Government
Program Participant Budget Social
MFIP Financial Incentives Only (Minnesota)
Operating cost NA -$341 -$341
Net gain or net loss (net value) $10,141 -$10,958 -$815
Return per net dollar invested by the government (ROI) NA NA NA
SSP Applicants (Canada)
Operating cost NA $1,398 $1,398
Net gain or net loss (net value) $6,589 -$580 $6,009
Return per net dollar invested by the government (ROI) 4.71 0.58 5.30
SSP Recipients (Canada)
Operating cost NA $1,240 $1,240
Net gain or net loss (net value) $4,614 -$2,363 $2,251
Return per net dollar invested by the government (ROI) 3.72 -0.91 2.82
WRP Financial Incentives Only (Vermont)
Operating cost NA -$284 -$284
Net gain or net loss (net value) $239 -$228 $13
Return per net dollar invested by the government (ROI) NA NA NA
SOURCES: Published reports from the program evaluations. See References and Bibliography. 
NOTES: See Appendix Tables B.14, B.15, and B.16. 
See Box 3.1 for an explanation of how to calculate the ROI from each perspective.  
The MFIP and WRP programs resulted in a savings from operating costs, so the ROI calculation did not  
make sense and thus is not presented in this table. 
The return to participants was quite positive for the SSP program regardless of target 
population: For every dollar the government invested, participants in the recipient program 
received $3.72, and participants in the applicant program received $4.71. The ROI from the 
government budget perspective was expected to be low, due to the way earnings supplement 
programs operate, and, indeed, this is the case. The government spent an additional 91 cents for 
every dollar it invested in the SSP recipient program, and it received 58 cents for every dollar it 
invested in the applicant program. 
In sum, earnings supplement programs are successful in achieving their major goal of 
increasing participant income, and, as expected, they result in net losses for the government.
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 Box 7.2 
MFIP Incentives Only Versus Full MFIP 
Two versions of MFIP were tested in Minnesota: one that provided only financial incentives, 
which is the program variant discussed in the synthesis, and full MFIP, which added mandato-
ry employment services to the earnings supplement. Full MFIP can be viewed as a job-search-
first program that also provided financial incentives, because job search was the first activity 
for almost all participants. The two program variants can be directly compared because the 
MFIP evaluation used a three-group research design, in which welfare recipients were random-
ly assigned to one of two program variants or to a control group. 
Full MFIP appears to have been more cost-beneficial than MFIP Incentives Only. For exam-
ple, the net gains enjoyed by participants were considerably larger ($13,138 versus $10,141), 
while the net losses experienced by government budgets were virtually the same ($10,880 
versus $10,958). However, as a result of providing mandatory employment services, program 
operating costs were also much larger for full MFIP ($2,510; MFIP Incentives Only resulted in 
a savings in operating costs compared with the regular welfare program ($341). 
This raises the obvious question of whether the additional benefits were worth the additional 
costs. One way of addressing this question is to compute “marginal return-on-investment 
(ROI) ratios” for participants and the government. These ratios are analogous to the ROI ratios 
presented in the main text except that the additional program benefits produced by full MFIP 
are divided by the additional costs required to operate full MFIP. These marginal ROI ratios 
for program participants and the government were 1.05 and 1.03, respectively, suggesting that 
the participants received $1.03 for each additional dollar that the government invested in 
mandatory employment services and the government received $1.03 for each additional dollar 
it invested in full MFIP relative to MFIP Incentives Only.* Thus, adding employment services 
to the financial incentives offered in the Minnesota program appears to have had a positive 
financial payoff for program participants, while the government more or less broke even. 
NOTES: *The denominator of both ratios is simply the difference in operating costs between the two 
program variants ($2,510 + $341 = $2,851). Similarly, the numerator for participants is the difference in 
net gains for participants between the two program ($13,138 – $10,141 = $2,997). To compute the 
numerator from the government budget perspective, the net gain and net loss estimates must first be 
expunged of operating costs, and then the difference between the values for the two program variants 
must be calculated. Thus, the numerator for the government is $2,929 [= {(–$10,880) – (–$2,510)} – {(–
$10,958) – ($341)}]. 
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Chapter 8 
Time-Limit-Mix Programs 
Many states substantially reformed their welfare programs even before the federal 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) became law 
in August 1996. Between 1993 and 1996, more than 40 states were granted waivers of 
federal welfare rules, allowing them to implement a wide variety of policy changes de-
signed to promote work and self-sufficiency among welfare recipients. The three programs 
in the time-limit-mix category were among those that were granted waivers, and they 
represent a combined test of different features that were being discussed in the early 1990s. 
All the programs in this category were designed to increase the self-sufficiency of welfare 
recipients by creating employment mandates, offering financial incentives, and time-
limiting assistance. 
Mandates 
All three programs required welfare recipients to participate in employment-
oriented activities. Florida’s Family Transition Program (FTP) provided an array of services 
and incentives to help program participants find work, including intensive case manage-
ment, education, training, job placement services, and increased support services. FTP 
participants were more likely than the control group to be required to participate in em-
ployment-related activities. In addition, the program incorporated parental responsibility 
mandates, which required parents to ensure that their children were attending school 
regularly and to speak with their children’s teachers at least once each grading period. For 
the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, new applicants with 
preschool children were required to provide proof that their children had begun to receive a 
standard series of immunizations. Parents who failed to meet these requirements faced 
sanctions (that is, their grants could be canceled or reduced). 
The Connecticut Jobs First program included mandatory “work-first” services, 
wherein Jobs First group members were required to look for a job, either on their own or 
through Job Search Skills Training courses that taught job-seeking and job-holding skills. 
Education and training were generally restricted to those who were unable to find a job 
despite lengthy up-front job search activities. Recipients who failed to meet these require-
ments could be sanctioned. During the first 21 months of assistance, sanctions involved 
reducing a welfare grant or closing a case for three months. The penalties became stricter 
after the time limit: A single instance of noncompliance during an extension could have 
resulted in permanent discontinuance of the entire welfare grant. 
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Vermont’s Welfare Restructuring Project (WRP) required members of the program 
group who had been in the program for 30 months without finding employment to take 
subsidized minimum-wage community service jobs. Single parents with children under age 
13 were required to work half time; those with older children were required to work full 
time. In Vermont, virtually all adult AFDC recipients (including both program group 
members and control group members) could participate voluntarily in the state’s welfare-to-
work program, which provided employment training, case management, and support 
services. Under WRP, participation was voluntary until two months before a recipient 
reached the 30-month work requirement point, when job classes became mandatory. Unlike 
recipients in many other states, single parents who failed to comply with WRP’s work 
requirement did not have their welfare grant reduced or closed; rather, the state took control 
of their grant, used the money to pay their bills, and required them to attend three meetings 
at the welfare office each month. Noncompliance with this process resulted in the loss of 
benefits (although parents could reapply for benefits). 
Financial Incentives 
All three time-limit-mix programs delivered financial incentives through the regular 
welfare system by changing the welfare rules so that work was rewarded more than it was 
under the existing rules. Specifically, these rule changes reduced the rate at which welfare 
payments fell as earnings increased. All three programs also increased the asset limit at 
which individuals ceased being eligible for welfare benefits. This meant that welfare 
recipients could accumulate more savings from earnings without losing their eligibility for 
assistance and could own a more valuable car. 
Under FTP, the first $200 plus one-half of any remaining earned income was disre-
garded when determining eligibility for welfare payments. The Connecticut Jobs First 
program disregarded 100 percent of earned income for families with earnings below the 
federal poverty level.1 Under the WRP program, the financial incentive was the same as that 
discussed in Chapter 7: the first $150 plus 25 percent of any remaining earned income was 
disregarded. However, as discussed in Chapter 7, the WRP financial incentives were not 
substantially different from those under the regular welfare rules. 
There were other financial incentives provided by these programs. For example, 
WRP changed the process used in collecting child support payments from noncustodial 
parents on the behalf of children receiving assistance in order to make the payments more 
                                                 
1In 1998, which was the midpoint of the study period, the federal poverty level was $1,411 per month in 
2006 dollars for a family of three. 
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visible to the custodial parents. It also expanded support for families who left welfare for 
work by providing three years of transitional Medicaid coverage and transitional child care 
assistance on a sliding scale to families whose incomes did not exceed 80 percent of the 
state median. The rules in the absence of WRP provided only one year of both types of 
transitional benefits. The Connecticut Jobs First program also changed some key rules 
about the interaction between child support payments and welfare benefits, which allowed 
participants to receive more in child support payments. The Connecticut Jobs First program 
also provided an additional year of transitional Medicaid coverage, as well as child care 
assistance for those with incomes below 75 percent of state median. FTP provided an 
additional year of transitional child care assistance. 
Time Limits 
Welfare time limits came into the public eye during the 1992 presidential campaign, 
when candidate Bill Clinton promised to limit families to two years of welfare benefits. 
Although a national welfare time limit –– a 60-month lifetime limit on federally funded 
assistance for most families –– was not actually enacted until 1996, some states reacted 
earlier by implementing programs of their own with time limits, often with shorter time 
frames than those eventually imposed at the federal level. By mid-1996, more than 30 states 
had been granted federal waivers that allowed them to implement some form of welfare 
time limit in at least part of the state. 
The Florida Family Transition Program and the Connecticut Jobs First program 
both had time limits that restricted the length of time that families could continue receiving 
welfare. The time limit tested in the WRP program differed from the limits tested by FTP 
and Jobs First because it had a work-trigger time limit, which did not limit the time on 
welfare but instead required welfare recipients to begin working after receiving benefits for 
a certain length of time. FTP limited most families to 24 months of cash welfare assistance 
in any 60-month period (the least job-ready were limited to 36 months in any 72-month 
period). The Connecticut Jobs First program limited families to 21 cumulative months of 
cash assistance. However, extensions were available to participants who made a good-faith 
effort to find employment and who had income below the welfare payment standard. The 
WRP program required recipients to begin working after 30 months of welfare receipt. 
Control Group Comparison 
All of the control groups that were used in the evaluations of the time-limit-mix 
programs were not subject to a time limit and were not provided financial incentives. 
However, they were eligible for other services or subject to other mandates. The control 
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group for the test of the WRP program could participate in the state’s welfare-to-work 
program but was not required to do so at any point. In the FTP and Connecticut Jobs First 
tests, the control group was required to participate in the preexisting welfare-to-work 
program. The control group in the Connecticut Jobs First study also was subject to broader 
exemption criteria and a somewhat stronger focus on education and training than the 
Connecticut Jobs First program group. The control group in the FTP study was subject to 
the preexisting Project Independence welfare-to-work program, which offered case man-
agement, support services, and employment services. Although FTP and the control group 
program (Project Independence) offered similar services, FTP had smaller caseloads and 
greater funding and, therefore, was able to offer enhanced services, such as having child 
care counselors in the FTP offices, reserved slots for social and health services, one-on-one 
job placement help for those approaching the time limit who had not found employment, 
subsidies for employers who agreed to hire welfare recipients who were approaching the 
time limit, special short-term occupational training programs (which were linked to local 
industries and employers), and a broader range of assessments. 
Thus, the benefit-cost analyses that are discussed next compare programs that had 
welfare time limits, financial incentives, and services with programs that provided some-
what different services and had no welfare time limits and financial incentives. 
Benefit-Cost Estimates 
The findings summarized in this chapter support the following conclusions regard-
ing time-limit-mix programs: 
• Time-limit-mix programs try to balance reducing long-term government ex-
penditures with making participants better off and, thus, are appropriately as-
sessed from both the government budget and the participant perspective. 
While all three of these programs resulted in net gains for participants, two 
produced net losses from the government budget perspective. 
• Two of the three programs had net gains from the social perspective. 
All three of the time-limit-mix programs produced net gains from the participant 
perspective (Figure 8.1). FTP and WRP reduced participants’ transfer payments, but by less 
than their earnings gains. Transfer payments, as well as earnings, increased as a result of the 
Connecticut Jobs First program. In addition, participants also received more support 
services under all three programs. The return-on-investment (ROI) ratios for participants in 
these three programs ranged from 0.19 to 2.51, which means that participants gained 
between 19 cents and $2.51 for every dollar that the government invested (Table 8.1). 
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Welfare-to-Work Program Benefits and Costs
Figure 8.1
Time-Limit-Mix Programs:
Five-Year Estimated Net Value per Program Group Member
(in 2006 dollars)
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SOURCES: Published reports from the program evaluations. See References and Bibliography.
NOTES: See Appendix Tables B.17, B.18, and B.19.
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Welfare-to-Work Program Benefits and Costs
Table 8.1
Time-Limit-Mix Programs:
Five-Year Estimated Operating Costs, Net Value, 
and ROI per Program Group Member
(in 2006 dollars)
Accounting Perspective
Government
Program Participant Budget Social
FTP (Florida)
Operating cost NA $10,175 $10,175
Net gain or net loss (net value) $1,983 -$8,128 -$6,374
Return per net dollar invested by the government (ROI) 0.19 0.20 0.37
Jobs First (Connecticut)
Operating cost NA $2,725 $2,725
Net gain or net loss (net value) $6,839 -$5,111 $1,512
Return per net dollar invested by the government (ROI) 2.51 -0.88 1.55
Full WRP (Vermont)
Operating cost NA $1,568 $1,568
Net gain or net loss (net value) $1,754 $402 $1,978
Return per net dollar invested by the government (ROI) 1.12 1.26 2.26
SOURCES: Published reports from the program evaluations. See References and Bibliography. 
NOTES: See Appendix Tables B.17, B.18, and B.19.  
See Box 3.1 for an explanation of how to calculate the ROI from each perspective.  
 
The results are more negative from the government budget perspective. Two of the 
three programs resulted in large net losses from this perspective, while the other program 
produced a small net benefit (Figure 8.1). The savings from transfer payments and in-
creased revenue were exceeded by the operating costs of FTP. This may be due to the 
virtually unlimited funding given to the program. The high cost of FTP is not representative 
of typical welfare-to-work programs. While the Connecticut Jobs First program was much 
less expensive to operate than FTP, transfer payments increased under Jobs First. This is 
probably attributable to the program’s financial incentives. The WRP program was the only 
program examined in this chapter that had savings from transfer payments that exceeded its 
operating costs. These savings may have occurred partially because the financial incentives 
that were offered were not very different from the regular welfare program. 
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The government’s ROI ratio ranged from –0.88 to 1.26 (Table 8.1). The WRP pro-
gram was the only one of the three programs for which the government’s ROI exceeded 
what it invested. In the Connecticut Jobs First program, Medicaid, food stamps, and Earned 
Income Tax Credit (EITC) payments all increased, and there were no offsetting cost 
reductions. As a result, the government’s ROI ratio was negative. 
In summary, all three of the time-limit-mix programs resulted in net gains from the 
participant perspective, while only one produced net gains from the government budget 
perspective. Time-limit-mix programs were able to increase the incomes of participants but 
often were not able to control government costs. This implies, perhaps, that the time limits 
tested in these programs had a less powerful influence than the financial incentives that 
were also provided by these programs. As suggested in Chapter 7, financial incentives have 
positive effects on participants and negative effects on the government’s budget. Time 
limits, in contrast, might be expected to operate in the opposite direction. (As seen in 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6, the influence of the employment-orientated services provided by these 
programs could go in either direction.) Thus, these programs were only partially successful 
in achieving their goal of balancing fiscal responsibility and increasing participant income. 
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 Box 8.1 
WRP Financial Incentives Only Verus Full WRP 
The design of the WRP program allows the effect of the work requirement to be isolated and 
measured. Two versions of WRP were tested: WRP Financial Incentives Only, in which, as 
discussed in Chapter 7, participants were eligible for small financial incentives but did not 
have a work requirement; and full WRP, in which, as discussed in this chapter, participants 
were subject to a work requirement, eligible for financial incentives, and may also have been 
required to participate in job classes and work experience. Comparing full WRP with WRP 
Financial Incentives Only, in contrast, shows the effects of adding the work requirement to the 
financial incentives. 
WRP Financial Incentives Only appears to be less cost-beneficial than full WRP. While the net 
gains enjoyed by participants were considerably larger for full WRP than for WRP Financial 
Incentives Only ($1,754 versus $239), from the government budget perspective, full WRP had 
a net gain, and WRP Financial Incentives Only had a net loss ($402 versus –$228). However, 
operating costs were much higher for full WRP ($1,568); WRP Financial Incentives Only 
resulted in a savings in operating costs compared with the regular welfare program ($284). 
This raises the obvious question of whether the additional benefits were worth the additional 
costs. One way of addressing this question is to compute “marginal return-on-investment 
(ROI) ratios” for participants and the government. As described in Box 7.2, these ratios are 
analogous to the ROI ratios presented in the main text, except that the additional program 
benefits produced by full WRP, relative to WRP Financial Incentives Only, are divided by the 
additional costs required to operate full WRP. These marginal ROI ratios for program partici-
pants and the government were .82 and 1.34, respectively, suggesting that the participants 
received 82 cents for each additional dollar that the government invested in the work require-
ment, job classes, and work experience — features not included in WRP Financial Incentives 
Only — and the government received $1.34 for each additional dollar that it invested in full 
WRP relative to WRP Financial Incentives Only. Thus, adding a work requirement, job 
classes, and work experience to the financial incentives offered in the WRP program appears 
to have had a positive financial payoff for program participants and the government. 
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Chapter 9 
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
In this synthesis, the findings from benefit-cost analyses have been separately examined 
for six different types of programs, focusing particularly on the vantage points of program 
participants and of the government budget but also indicating findings from the perspective of 
society as a whole. One of the strengths of benefit-cost analysis comes from the ability to 
examine benefit-cost results by different perspectives. As indicated in Chapter 2, benefit-cost 
findings for society typically are almost entirely driven by program operating costs and program 
effects on earnings. Benefit-cost results from the participant perspective are contingent on both 
program earnings effects and program effects on transfer payments (for example, welfare, food 
stamps, and Medicaid) but are not influenced by program operating costs. Like the social 
perspective, benefit-cost findings from the government budget perspective also depend on 
program operating costs, but they are much more influenced by program effects on transfer 
payments than by program effects on earnings. However, increases in earnings that result from 
programs also increase the tax receipts of the government and usually reduce the amount of 
transfer payments that the government must provide –– but these relationships are complex. As 
previously shown, for example, in the case of earnings supplement programs (Chapter 7), 
welfare payments may increase as earnings also increase. 
Program Goals, Trade-Offs, and Implications of the Findings 
As shown in Table 9.1, regardless of which perspective is being considered, the find-
ings for different types of programs also differ considerably from one another. These differences 
reflect the fact that some program types perform better than others, as summarized below. 
Different types of programs emphasize different goals, and so the perspective that is 
used to assess the program type differs. Thus, whether a program is judged as a success in terms 
of its benefit-cost performance depends on what policymakers are attempting to accomplish, 
and those goals, in turn, should influence the perspective that is weighed most heavily in 
assessing the program (Table 9.2). The following paragraphs summarize the findings in this 
synthesis, structured according to the programs’ most emphasized goals. 
Programs Most Focused on Reducing Welfare Costs 
Mandatory work experience programs (Chapter 3) and mandatory job-search-first pro-
grams (Chapter 4) are particularly focused on reducing welfare dependency and, hence, the cost 
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Table 9.1
Five-Year Summary Statistics of Net Value
and ROI per Program Group Member,
by Program Type (in 2006 dollars)
Program Type Mean Median Minimum Maximum
Mandatory work experience
Participant perspective $285 $310 -$163 $707
(4.77) (2.22) -(0.32) (12.40)
Government budget perspective $103 -$328 -$365 $1,002
(1.04) (0.35) -(5.40) (8.17)
Social perspective $1,162 $1,261 $503 $1,720
(8.88) (9.82) (3.50) (13.32)
Mandatory job-search-first
Participant perspective -$570 $196 -$2,729 $837
-(0.16) (0.04) -(1.13) (0.49)
Government budget perspective $1,954 $2,266 -$932 $3,521
(1.97) (2.34) (0.81) (2.77)
Social perspective $1,215 $654 -$946 $3,552
(1.74) (1.27) (0.80) (3.06)
Mandatory education-first
Participant perspective -$1,360 -$1,554 -$3,571 $569
-(0.27) -(0.32) -(0.65) (0.13)
Government budget perspective -$745 -$387 -$3,943 $735
(0.86) (0.88) (0.41) (1.13)
Social perspective -$2,234 -$2,510 -$3,545 -$205
(0.57) (0.50) (0.38) (0.92)
Mandatory mixed-initial-activity
Participant perspective 808 $1,422 -$2,178 $2,651
(0.27) (0.35) -(0.32) (1.19)
Government budget perspective -$67 $89 -$4,803 $6,337
(1.27) (1.06) (0.17) (2.84)
Social perspective $515 $774 -$7,042 $6,221
(1.47) (1.10) (0.13) (3.79)
(continued)
Welfare-to-Work Program Benefits and Costs
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Program Type Mean Median Minimum Maximum
Earnings supplementa
Participant perspective 5,396 $5,602 $239 $10,141
(4.22) (4.22) (3.72) (4.71)
Government budget perspective -$3,532 -$1,472 -10,958 -$228
-(.16) -(0.16) -(0.91) (0.58)
Social perspective $1,865 $1,132 -$815 $6,009
(4.06) (4.06) (2.82) (5.30)
Time-limit-mix
Participant perspective $3,525 $1,983 $1,754 $6,839
(1.27) (1.27) (0.19) (2.51)
Government budget perspective -$4,279 -$5,111 -$8,128 $402
(0.19) (0.20) -(0.88) (1.26)
Social perspective -$961 $1,512 -$6,374 $1,978
(1.40) (1.55) (0.37) (2.26)
Table 9.1 (continued)
SOURCES: Published reports from the program evaluations. See References and Bibliography. 
NOTES: Appendix B presents individual results for each type of program and perspective.  
The ROI appears in parentheses.
Earnings supplement ROI numbers refer only to two of four programs. Two programs resulted in a savings from 
operating costs, so the ROI calculation did not make sense and thus is not presented.
aApplicant results for Canada's Self-Sufficiency Project (SSP) are a six-year estimate.
of welfare. Thus, the government budget perspective is especially relevant in judging such 
programs. 
• Mandatory work experience programs had weak results from the government 
budget perspective. Neither the mean nor the median net value from the gov-
ernment budget perspective differs much from zero for mandatory work ex-
perience programs ($103 and –$328, respectively). 
• Job-search-first programs do rather well from the government budget per-
spective. As shown in Table 9.1, both the mean and the median net value 
from this perspective are approximately $2,000 for job-search-first programs. 
These programs are much less successful in increasing the incomes of partic-
ipants, but that is not the goal they emphasize. 
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Program Type
Most 
Emphasized 
Benefit-Cost 
Goal
Did 
Participant 
Income 
Increase?
Did 
Government 
Budgetary 
Position 
Improve? Further Considerations
Mandatory work experience Reduce 
welfare costs
Mixed MIXED Small net values from 
participant and government 
perspectives; from social 
perspective, consistent net 
gains due to work 
experience output
Mandatory job-search-first Reduce 
welfare costs
No YES Small net gains or 
substantial net losses to 
participants
Mandatory education-first Increase 
participant 
income
NO No Least successful program 
type
Mandatory mixed-initial-activity Balance 
reducing 
welfare costs 
and increasing 
participant 
income
YES YES Goal not achieved by two 
programs targeting long-
term welfare recipients 
Earnings supplement Increase 
participant 
income
YES No Largest participant net 
gains; an efficient 
mechanism for transferring 
income, even though 
resulting in net losses for 
government budget
Time-limit-mix Balance 
reducing 
welfare costs 
and increasing 
participant 
income
YES MIXED Losses for the government 
budget occurred more 
often than gains
Welfare-to-Work Program Benefits and Costs
Table 9.2
Benefit-Cost Performance of Each Program Type
NOTE: The underlined, full-capitalized perspective is the benefit-cost perspective that is most useful for 
determining whether the program type achieved its most emphasized benefit-cost goal. 
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Programs Most Focused on Increasing Participant Income 
A major goal of mandatory education-first programs (Chapter 5) and earnings supple-
ment programs (Chapter 7) is to make participants better off. Thus, the participant perspective is 
particularly pertinent in assessing these programs. 
• Education-first programs perform poorly from the participant perspective. 
For education-first programs, the participant perspective mean and median 
net value both indicate net losses of more than $1,000. 
• Earnings supplement programs perform very well from the participant per-
spective. As shown in Table 9.1, both the mean and the median net gain from 
the participant perspective are above $5,000 for earnings supplement pro-
grams. Because the cost-benefit studies included in this synthesis assume that 
program benefits continued to exist for only five years, the net gains of pro-
gram participants would be even larger than those implied by Table 9.1 if –– 
as a result of job experience gained while participants received earnings sup-
plements –– the effects on earnings extended beyond five years. Unfortunate-
ly, however, these effects diminished over time, reaching zero before or just 
after the end of the five-year period.1 
Programs Most Focused on Balancing Participant and Government Gains 
Some programs, such as mixed-initial-activity (Chapter 6) and time-limit-mix programs 
(Chapter 8), attempt to balance reducing government costs with increasing the financial well-
being of participants. One way to judge these programs is to use both the participant and the 
government perspective. 
• Mixed-initial activity programs were cost-beneficial for participants, but not 
necessarily from the government budget perspective. From the participant 
perspective, the mean and the median net value for this program type both 
show net benefits of around $1,000 ($808 and $1,422, respectively). From 
the government budget perspective, the mean and median net values are near 
zero (–$67 and $89, respectively). However, two of the eight mixed-initial-
activity programs targeted only long-term welfare recipients. When only the 
remaining six mixed-initial-activity programs are considered, the mean and 
median net gains from the participant perspective are $1,188 and $1,762, re-
spectively, and the mean and median net gains from the government budget 
                                                 
1For a detailed analysis, see Michalopoulos (2005). 
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perspective are $1,421 and $585, respectively. (These values are not shown 
in Table 9.2.) 
• Time-limit-mix programs had mixed success in achieving their emphasized 
goal: While all three of these programs resulted in net gains for participants, 
two produced net losses from the government budget perspective. From the 
participant perspective, both the mean and the median net value indicate a 
sizable net gain ($3,525 and $1,983, respectively); whereas from the gov-
ernment budget perspective, both the mean and the median net value show a 
large net loss (–$4,279 and –$5,111, respectively). 
The discussion above is not intended to suggest that any welfare-to-work programs 
should be assessed from only one perspective. All three perspectives are germane, but the goals 
most emphasized by policymakers naturally affect which perspective is given the most weight. 
As shown in Table 9.2, when looking at each program category only in terms of the most 
emphasized goal of programs in the category, three of the six program types (job-search-first 
programs, mixed-initial-activity programs, and earnings supplement programs) achieved their 
goals; two program types (mandatory work experience programs and time-limit-mix programs) 
produced more mixed results. Programs in the category of mandatory education-first programs 
–– which emphasized General Educational Development (GED) classes and Adult Basic 
Education –– did not achieve the goal that received the greatest emphasis: that of increasing the 
income of participants. They were also not very successful in saving the government money. 
While the analyses presented in this synthesis suggest that many welfare-to-work pro-
grams are successful in either making participants better off financially or controlling govern-
ment costs, there are often trade-offs between these goals. On the one hand, both earnings 
supplement programs and time-limit-mix programs appear to be beneficial for participants, but 
they tend to be costly for the government. These costs must obviously be considered in drawing 
conclusions about the programs. On the other hand, job-search-first programs tend to be 
beneficial for the government budget but result either in small benefits or in losses for partici-
pants. There are often gains to society as a whole from all three of these program types, howev-
er, because the gains to the group that receives benefits exceed the costs to the group that 
experiences losses. Finally, some programs are fairly consistent in their results from all three 
perspectives and thus do not necessitate trade-offs among the perspectives. For example, some 
mixed-initial-activity programs and mandatory unpaid work experience programs are positive 
from all three perspectives, although the net gains from the participant and the government 
budget perspectives are very small for the unpaid work experience programs. In contrast, 
education-first programs, which emphasize GED and Adult Basic Education, are sometimes 
negative from all three perspectives. 
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Policy Conclusions 
Overall, the benefit-cost findings suggest the following policy conclusions: 
• Earnings supplement programs are an efficient mechanism for transferring 
income to low-income families because participants gain more than a dollar 
for every dollar the government spends. Most transfer programs, in contrast, 
cost the government more than a dollar for each dollar increase in the income 
of recipients. 
• Mandatory mixed-initial-activity programs that enroll both short-term and 
long-term welfare recipients are worthy of consideration by states developing 
welfare-to-work programs. They can be cost-beneficial for both the govern-
ment and those required to participate in them. 
• Mandatory job-search-first programs are worthy of consideration when gov-
ernments want to reduce expenditures. They tend to be less expensive than 
mandatory mixed-initial-activity programs and, thus, to have a more salutary 
effect on government budgets. However, they are also less successful in in-
creasing the incomes of those required to participate in them. 
• Mandatory work experience programs are worthy of consideration as a com-
ponent of a comprehensive welfare-to-work programs. Implemented for 
those who, after a period of time, cannot find unsubsidized jobs through job 
search, these programs are not costly to government and do little harm to par-
ticipants. Moreover, society as a whole can reap some benefit from the out-
put produced at work experience jobs. 
• The sorts of mandatory education-first programs that have been tested exper-
imentally — those that emphasize GED and Adult Basic Education — do not 
appear to be cost-beneficial. They do little to either increase the incomes of 
participants or save the government money. 
• Because only three time-limit-mix programs are included in this synthesis 
and they differ considerably from one another, it is difficult to draw firm 
conclusions about them. Thus, suffice it to note that while all three resulted in 
substantial net gains from the participant perspective, two also resulted in 
substantial net losses from the government budget perspective. 
The conclusions drawn above must be qualified, however, because they are based en-
tirely on costs and benefits that are naturally expressed in dollars and that could be readily 
measured. Thus, some welfare-to-work programs that appear cost-beneficial on the basis of 
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their measured monetary benefits may not have actually had benefits in excess of their costs had 
their nonmonetary effects also been measured. Similarly, some programs that did not seem cost-
beneficial may have produced benefits that exceeded their costs had these other effects been 
measured.2 This underscores the fact that benefit-cost analyses can monetize only some costs 
and benefits; goals and values must be taken into account in overall assessments of program 
types. 
It is complex trade-offs, such as the ones noted in this chapter, that are informed by the 
benefit-cost findings contained in this synthesis. As states seek strategies to move more welfare 
recipients into work and attempt to improve their policies for low-income families, it is hoped 
that this report will provide policymakers with some evidence-based considerations. 
                                                 
2In a recent article, Greenberg and Cebulla (2008) conclude that the most important of the nonmea-
sured benefits and costs are likely to be the value of time lost to program participants who increase their 
hours and so-called displacement effects that result if participants in welfare-to-work programs search 
harder for jobs or if they work more than they otherwise would, and, as a consequence, workers who 
compete with them in the labor market are made worse off. Thus, they suggest that the estimated benefits 
of welfare-to-work programs tend to be overstated relative to the costs of these programs. However, this 
overstatement of the net values would be mitigated to the extent that program benefits persist for longer 
than the five years that is observed in the benefit-cost studies included in this synthesis, although there is 
some evidence that benefits are unlikely to persist past five years in typical welfare-to-work programs 
(Greenberg, Ashworth, Cebulla, and Walker, 2004). 
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Box 9.1 
Exceptionally Successful and Unsuccessful Programs 
Of the 28 programs included in this synthesis, it is obvious from the tables and figures pre-
sented throughout that some programs have performed exceptionally well or poorly from the 
participant or the government budget perspective. It is useful to examine these programs and 
briefly speculate as to the reasons why they are exceptional. For this purpose, “exceptional” is 
somewhat arbitrarily defined as programs that resulted in either net gains or net losses of over 
$3,000 from either the participant perspective or the government budget perspective or both. 
Consistent with the other findings reported in this synthesis, determining whether programs 
exceeded the $3,000 threshold relies on estimates of costs and benefits over a five-year period 
that began with random assignment –– appropriately discounted to account for the greater 
value of dollars received or expended earlier in this period than of dollars received or expended 
later. Note that exceptional programs may be more difficult to replicate.  
Thirteen programs qualify. Of these, only two programs qualified from both perspectives. 
These two programs (MFIP Incentives Only and Connecticut’s Jobs First) both featured 
generous earnings supplements that resulted in exceptionally large net gains for participants 
and exceptionally large net losses from the government perspective. Importantly, no program 
had exceptional net gains from both perspectives (although Riverside GAIN was close, with a 
net gain in participant income of $2,651) or exceptional net losses from both perspectives 
(although Los Angeles GAIN was fairly close, with net losses from the participant perspective 
of over $2,000). 
There were seven programs that resulted in exceptionally large net losses from the government 
budget perspective. As mentioned above, two of these programs provided generous earnings 
supplements. Interestingly, SSP in Canada also provided generous earnings supplements; but 
while SSP resulted in exceptional net gains for participants, the net losses to the government’s 
budget were not exceptionally large. This is probably attributable to the SSP program’s limit-
ing the receipt of earnings supplements to individuals who worked at least 30 hours a week. 
Tulare GAIN had exceptionally large losses because the gains from increased tax revenues and 
decreased welfare payments were quite small and, therefore, were not able to offset the cost of 
the program. The remaining four programs (Atlanta HCD NEWWS, Alameda GAIN, Los 
Angeles GAIN, and Florida FTP) that produced exceptional losses from the government’s 
perspective had larger operating costs than any of the remaining 23 programs included in the 
synthesis. Any reductions in transfer payments and increases in tax receipts that resulted from 
these programs could not come close to offsetting these large operating costs, which ranged 
from nearly $7,000 to just over $10,000 per program participant. In addition, the two GAIN 
programs limited participation to long-term welfare recipients. 
Four programs produced exceptionally large net gains from the government budget perspec-
tive. All four of these programs (Portland NEWWS, Grand Rapids LFA NEWWS, Los 
Angeles Jobs-First GAIN, and Riverside GAIN) put considerable emphasis on job search and 
considerable pressure on most participants to take jobs as quickly as possible (although pro-
grams that do not qualify as “exceptional” followed this practice as well). However, the 
program that produced the largest net gains for the government budget, Portland NEWWS,  
(continued) 
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 Net Net Net Net Possible Reason for 
Programs Gains Losses Gains Losses Exceptional Results
SSP Applicants X
SSP Recipients X
MFIP Financial Incentives Only X X
Jobs First X X
Atlanta HCD NEWWS X
Alameda GAIN X
Los Angeles GAIN X
FTP X
Tulare GAIN X Small benefits
Portland NEWWS X
Grand Rapids LFA NEWWS X
Los  Angeles Jobs-First GAIN X
Riverside GAIN X
Riverside HCD NEWWS X
(net gains and/or net losses of over $3,000 per client over five years)
Programs with Exceptional Results
Served individuals more likely to 
remain on welfare and out of 
the job market, which might 
have been reinforced by 
emphasis on basic education 
Emphasis on job search
Participant Perspective Government Perspective
Large operating costs
Earnings supplements featured
Box 9.1 (continued) 
encouraged participants to wait for “good” jobs. It also had larger operating costs than the 
other three programs, probably because it was a mixed-initial-activity program and initially 
provided training and education to some participants. Interestingly, only one of these four 
programs, Grand Rapids LFA NEWWS, resulted in substantial net losses for participants.  
Except for programs that provided earnings supplements, none of the 28 programs included in 
the synthesis produced exceptional gains in participant incomes; and only one, Riverside HCD 
NEWWS, resulted in exceptionally large reductions in participant incomes. It is not entirely 
clear why these large net losses occurred. However, the program was limited to those deemed 
in need of basic education. As previously seen, moreover, programs like Riverside HCD 
NEWWS that emphasize basic education have not been very successful in general. 
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Appendix A 
Descriptions of the Welfare-to-Work Programs, by Type 

Appendix A 
 
Program Activitiesa Coverage and Mandatorinessb Sample and Site Characteristicsc 
Mandatory Work Experience 
    
Cook County 
WIN 
Demonstration 
(Chicago) 
Independent job search first, 
followed by an unpaid work 
experience position if 
employment was not found 
while participating in job 
search. 
 
Mandatory for welfare 
applicants and recipients with 
no children under 6 years of 
age 
Began in 1985 
Urban labor market 
1/3 new recipients and 2/3 
ongoing recipients  
San Diego 
 
Group job search first, 
followed by an unpaid work 
experience position if 
employment was not found 
while participating in job 
search. 
  
Mandatory for welfare 
applicants with no children 
under age 6 
Began in 1982  
Mostly applicants  
Urban labor market 
West Virginia 
CWEP  
Open-ended unpaid work 
experience  
 
Mandatory for welfare 
applicants and recipients with 
no children under 6 years of 
age  
Began in 1983 
Rural labor market with very high 
unemployment 
Highly disadvantaged population 
 
Mandatory Job-Search-First 
    
Atlanta LFA 
NEWWS 
Job search (typically job club) 
was first activity for almost all 
participants; if no job after job 
search, short-term ABE and 
vocational training were most 
common activities 
 
Mandatory for welfare 
recipients with no children 
under age 3 
Began in 1992 
Mostly long-term recipients  
90% African-American 
Welfare grant: $280 (1993) 
Unemployment rate: 6.2% 
Grand Rapids 
LFA NEWWS 
Job search (typically job club) 
was first activity for almost all 
participants; if no job after job 
search, most common activity 
was work experience 
Mandatory for welfare 
recipients with no children 
under age 1 
Began in 1991 
Mostly long-term recipients  
50% white, 40% African-
American 
Welfare grant: $474 (1993) 
Unemployment rate: 5.5% 
 
Los Angeles 
Jobs-First 
GAIN 
Job club was initial activity 
for almost everyone  
Frequent use of financial 
sanctions (welfare grant 
reductions) 
Mandatory for welfare 
recipients with no children 
under age 3 
Began in 1996 
75% long-term recipients, 25% 
short-term recipients 
45% Hispanic, 30% African-
American, 15% white 
Welfare grant: $594 (1996) 
Unemployment rate: 8.2% 
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 75
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Program Activitiesa Coverage and Mandatorinessb Sample and Site Characteristicsc 
Mandatory Job-Search-First
    
Riverside 
LFA NEWWS 
Job search (typically job club) 
was first activity for almost all 
participants; if no job after job 
search, most common 
activities were job search and 
vocational training 
 
Mandatory for welfare 
recipients with no children 
under age 3 
Began in 1991 
Few new applicants 
50% white, 35% Hispanic  
Welfare grant: $624 (1993) 
Unemployment rate: 11.7% 
SWIM 
(San Diego) 
Two-week job search 
workshop followed by 
Employment Work 
Experience Program (EWEP) 
and job club; if no job after 13 
weeks, education and training 
assessment  
Mandatory for welfare 
recipients with no children 
under age 6 
Began in 1985  
Mix of applicants and recipients 
27% non-Hispanic white, 42% 
non-Hispanic African-American, 
26% Hispanic  
Welfare grant: $617 (1986)  
Unemployment rate: 5.3%  
    
    
  Mandatory Education-First 
    
Atlanta HCD 
NEWWS 
ABE was first activity for 
most people without a high 
school diploma or GED; 
vocational training was most 
common first activity for 
others 
 
Mandatory for welfare 
recipients with no children 
under age 3 
See Atlanta LFA 
Columbus 
Integrated 
NEWWS 
Education and training was 
first activity for almost all 
participants  
Integrated case management: 
One staff member managed 
both income maintenance and 
employment and training 
 
Mandatory for welfare 
recipients with no children 
under age 3 
Began in 1992 
Mostly long-term recipients 
50% white, 50% African-American 
Welfare grant: $341 (1993) 
Unemployment rate: 4.6% 
Columbus 
Traditional 
NEWWS 
Education and training was 
first activity for almost all 
participants  
Traditional case management:  
Different workers managed 
income maintenance and 
employment and training 
 
Mandatory for welfare 
recipients with no children 
under age 3 
See Columbus Integrated 
Detroit 
NEWWS 
Long-term education and 
training encouraged for first 
half of study period, job 
search emphasized for second 
half of study period 
Mandatory for welfare 
recipients with no children 
under age 1 
De facto voluntary 
Began in 1992 
Mostly long-term recipients 
Mostly African-American 
Welfare grant: $459 (1993) 
Unemployment rate: 8.0% 
 
    
(continued) 
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Program Activitiesa Coverage and Mandatorinessb Sample and Site Characteristicsc 
Mandatory Education-First
    
Grand Rapids 
HCD 
NEWWS 
ABE was first activity for 
most people without a high 
school diploma or GED; 
vocational training or post-
secondary education was most 
common first activity for 
others 
 
Mandatory for welfare 
recipients with no children 
under age 1 
See Grand Rapids LFA 
    
Riverside 
HCD 
NEWWS 
ABE was first activity for 
most people 
Mandatory for welfare 
recipients with no children 
under age 3 
Enrolled only those in need of 
basic education 
 
See Riverside LFA 
Mandatory Mixed-Initial-Activity 
    
Alameda GAIN 
 
Those with no high school 
diploma, lacked basic 
reading and math skills, or 
non-English-speaking were 
encouraged to participate in 
ABE prior to  job search; 
Job search (initially job club 
and supervised job search) 
otherwise; Some training, 
post-secondary education 
and unpaid work experience   
 
Mandatory for welfare 
recipients with no children 
under age 6 
Enrolled only long-term 
welfare recipients  
 
Began in 1988 
Mostly African-
American  
Welfare grant: $694 (1989) 
Unemployment rate: 
4.4%  
 
Butte GAIN See Alameda Mandatory for welfare 
recipients with no children 
under 6 
Delayed enrolling many 
participants for several 
months to keep cases per 
worker low 
 
Began in 1987 
Mostly applicants 
Mostly white 
Rural county 
Welfare grant: $694 (1989) 
Unemployment rate: 8.0% 
Los Angeles 
GAIN 
See Alameda Mandatory for welfare 
recipients with no children 
under age 6 
Enrolled only long-term 
recipients 
 
Began in 1988 
32% Hispanic, 45% African-
American 
Welfare grant: $694 (1989) 
Unemployment rate: 4.6% 
(continued) 
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Program Activitiesa Coverage and Mandatorinessb Sample and Site Characteristicsc 
Mandatory Mixed-Initial-Activity
    
Portland 
NEWWS 
ABE and training at discretion 
of case managers for less job-
ready; job search for others; 
encouraged people to look for 
work until they found full-
time jobs that paid more than 
the minimum wage and 
provided fringe benefits 
 
Mandatory for welfare 
recipients with no children 
under age 1 
Began in 1993 
Mostly long-term recipients 
80% white, 20% African-
American 
Welfare grant: $460 
Unemployment rate: 6.6% 
Project 
Independence 
(Florida) 
Job search (often independent 
job search) if completed 10th 
grade or had recent work 
experience; education and 
training otherwise  
Mandatory for welfare 
recipients with no children 
under age 3 
Began in 1990 
Statewide program; studied in 
nine counties  
Mostly applicants  
34% non-Hispanic white; 38% 
non-Hispanic African-American; 
22% Hispanic 
Welfare grant: $303 (1995) 
Unemployment rate: 6.0%-8.0% 
(depends on county) 
 
    
Riverside 
GAIN 
See Alameda 
Strongest employment focus 
of the six GAIN programs 
studied; encourage people in 
need of basic education to 
look for work instead 
 
Mandatory for welfare 
recipients with no children 
under age 6 
Began in 1987 
Broad welfare history mix  
50% white, 16% African-
American, 28% Hispanic 
Unemployment rate: 4.7% 
San Diego 
GAIN 
See Alameda Mandatory for welfare 
recipients with no children 
under age 6 
 
Began in 1987 
Broad welfare history mix and 
racial/ethnic mix  
Welfare grant: $694 (1989) 
Unemployment rate: 4.1% 
 
Tulare GAIN See Alameda Mandatory for welfare 
recipients with no children 
under age 6 
Began in 1988 
Mostly long-term recipients 
50% white, 40% Hispanic 
Agricultural county 
Welfare grant: $694 (1989) 
Unemployment rate: 10.3% 
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 78
Appendix A (continued) 
 
Program Activitiesa Coverage and Mandatorinessb Sample and Site Characteristicsc 
 Earnings Supplement 
    
MFIP 
Incentives 
Only 
 
Earning supplement offered 
through enhanced earnings 
disregard; if there was earned 
income, benefits equaled the 
maximum grant increased by 
20 percent, minus net income 
(Net income excluded 38 
percent of gross earnings).  
 
Included welfare recipients 
with no children under age 1 
Began in 1994 
Operated in three counties  
Long –Term Recipients: 53% 
white, 35% African-American 
Welfare grant: $532 (1994) 
Unemployment rate: 3.9% 
SSP (Canada) Generous earnings supplement 
equal to one-half the 
difference between earnings 
and a target level of earnings 
for people who left welfare for 
full-time work; supplement 
was available for up to three 
years. Supplements were 
available to recipients when 
the program began, but they 
were unavailable for an initial 
year for applicants.  
Offered to a randomly 
selected group of people who 
had been on welfare for one 
year or more (recipients) and 
applicants; fewer than 1 
percent of those asked refused 
to join the study 
Began in 1992 
Operated in New Brunswick and 
lower mainland of British 
Columbia 
Recipients: 10% First Nations 
ancestry, 13% foreign-born 
Applicants: 8% First Nations 
ancestry, 29% foreign-born 
Welfare grant: $Can 1,131 in 
British Columbia and $Can 747 in 
New Brunswick (1992) 
Unemployment rate: 10.5% 
(British Columbia), 12.8% (New 
Brunswick) 
 
WRP 
Incentives 
Only 
 
Modest work supports offered 
in the form of enhanced 
earnings disregard and larger 
child care and health 
insurance subsidies for those 
who left welfare for work 
 
All welfare recipients 
randomly assigned 
Began in 1994 
Statewide program; studied in six 
welfare districts 
Nearly 100% white 
Welfare grant: $640 (1997) 
Unemployment rate: 4.7% 
(continued) 
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Program Activitiesa Coverage and Mandatorinessb Sample and Site Characteristicsc 
Time-Limit-Mix 
    
FTP (Florida) Job search for those with 
higher levels of education, 
basic skills, and work 
experience; education and 
training for most others 
 
Earnings supplement offered 
through enhanced earnings 
disregard; first $200 of 
earnings disregarded, but 
welfare benefits reduced by 50 
cents for each additional 
dollar of earnings 
 
Time limit on welfare receipt 
of 24 or 36 months, depending 
on job readiness  
 
Mandatory for welfare 
recipients with no children 
under 6 months old  
Began in 1994 
Operated in Escambia County 
(Pensacola) 
50% applicants; 50% recipients  
50% white, 50% African-
American 
Welfare grant: $303 (1995) 
Unemployment rate: 4.7% 
Jobs First 
(Connecticut) 
Job search was first activity 
for most participants 
Earnings supplement offered 
through enhanced earnings 
disregard; earnings below 
federal poverty level 
disregarded, but entire welfare 
benefit eliminated if earnings 
exceeded federal poverty level 
Time limit on welfare receipt 
of 21 months, although many 
exemptions and extensions 
granted 
 
Mandatory for most welfare 
recipients  
Exemptions for those least 
likely to be able to work 
Began in 1996 
Statewide program evaluated in 
New Haven and Manchester  
40% applicants 
40% white, 40% African 
American 
Welfare grant: $543 (1998) 
Unemployment rate: 5.7% 
WRP Recipients required to work 
after 30 months of welfare 
receipt 
Modest work supports offered 
in the form of enhanced 
earnings disregard and larger 
child care and health 
insurance subsidies for those 
who left welfare for work 
All welfare recipients 
randomly assigned 
Recipients with children under 
18 months exempt from the 
work requirement 
Began in 1994 
Statewide program; studied in 
six welfare districts 
Nearly 100% white 
Welfare grant: $640 (1997) 
Unemployment rate: 4.7% 
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NOTES:  
aABE, which stands for “adult basic education,” includes remedial instruction in reading and math, General 
Educational Development (GED) exam preparation, and English as a Second Language (ESL) classes. 
bIn most studies of mandatory programs, people who were not required to participate in the programs were not 
included in the studies. The information presented in this column is not a complete listing of all client categories that 
were exempt from the mandates. 
cThe information in this column generally refers to the study, not the program. For example, the start date refers 
to the year in which random assignment for the evaluation began. The data on the proportion of welfare 
applicants/recipients and the ethnic breakdown refers to the research sample for the evaluation, not the general 
welfare caseload. The unemployment rate presented is for the year in which random assignment began. The welfare 
grant amounts shown are for a family of three. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B 
Supplementary Tables: 
Selected Characteristics of Sample Members 
and Detailed Benefit-Cost Analyses
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Cook West
County WIN San Virginia
Component Demonstration Diego CWEP
Financial effects
Earnings 314 -169
Fringe benefitsa 57 -31
Tax payments -90 -275 -6
Welfare payments 358 -581 -165
Food stamps
Medicaid
Other 22 -20 194
Net gain or net loss (net value) 707 310 -163
Return to participants per net dollar
invested by the government (ROI)b 12.40 2.22 -0.32
47
1,409
-223 14
Welfare-to-Work Program Benefits and Costs
Appendix Table B.2
Mandatory Work Experience Programs:
Five-Year Estimated Net Value per Program Group Member,
Participant Perspective (in 2006 dollars)
SOURCES: Published reports from the program evaluations. See Appendix B for full citations. 
NOTES: Estimates reflect discounting and adjustment for inflation. 
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment 
characteristics of sample members. 
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
Tests of statistical significance were not performed.  
aThese include employer-paid health and life insurance, pension contributions, and worker's 
compensation.  Paid leave is captured directly by the earnings estimate.  Employee-paid Social Security 
and Medicare taxes are included as tax payments.
bThe return to participants per net dollar invested is computed by dividing the net benefits to the 
participant by the operating costs of the program (represents government investment).
The Food stamps and Medicaid estimate for San Diego includes UI compensation and General Relief 
payments.
Support services estimate was not regression adjusted for the Cook County WIN Demonstration.
SOURCES: Published reports from the program evaluations. See References and Bibliography. 
NOTES: Estimates refl ct discounti g and adjustment for inflation. 
Estimates w re regression-adjusted using ordinary lea t squares, controlling for pre-random assignment 
characterist cs of sample me bers. 
i   ca se sli t is r a ci s i  cal l ti    iffere ces.
sts f st tisti l si ifi  ere t erf r e .  
a ese i cl e e l er- ai  health a  life i s ra ce, ension contributions, an  r er's 
compensation. Paid leave is captured directly by the earnings estimate.  Employee-paid Social Security and 
Medicare taxes are included as tax payments.
bThe return to participants per net dollar invested is co puted by dividing the net benefits to the 
participant by the operating costs of the program (represents government investment).
The food stamps and Medicaid estimates for San Diego include UI compensation and General Relief 
payments.
The support services estimate was not regression-adjusted for the Cook County WIN Demonstration.
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 Cook West
County WIN San Virginia
Component Demonstration Diego CWEP
Financial effects
Tax payments 111 275 6
Welfare payments -358 581 165
Food stamps
Medicaid
Transfer administration -15 63 19
Operating costsa -57 -140 -505
Other 0 0 0
Net gain or net loss (net value) -365 1,002 -328
Return to budget per
net dollar invested (ROI)b -5.40 8.17 0.35
-47 -14223
Welfare-to-Work Program Benefits and Costs
Appendix Table B.3
Mandatory Work Experience Programs:
Five-Year Estimated Net Value per Program Group Member,
Government Perspective (in 2006 dollars)
SOURCES: Published reports from the program evaluations. See References and Bibliography. 
NOTES: Estimates reflect discounting and adjustment for inflation.  
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment 
characteristics of sample members.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
Tests of statistical significance were not performed.  
aOperating costs include the net cost of program and nonprogram activities (including support services). 
bThe return to budget per net dollar invested is computed by dividing the sum of effects of transfer 
payments, transfer administration, and other effects by operating costs.
The food stamps and Medicaid estimates for San Diego include UI compensation and General Relief 
payments. 
The support services estimate was not regression-adjusted for the Cook County WIN Demonstration.
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Cook West
County WIN San Virginia
Component Demonstration Diego CWEP
Financial effects
Earnings 314 -169
Fringe benefits 57 -31
Tax payments 0 0 0
Welfare payments 0 0 0
Food stamps 0 0 0
Medicaid 0 0 0
Transfer administration -15 63 19
Operating costs -57 -140 -505
Output from work experience 182 409 1,752
Other 22 -20 194
Net gain or net loss (net value) 503 1,720 1,261
Return to society per net dollar
invested by the government (ROI)a 9.82 13.32 3.50
Welfare-to-Work Program Benefits and Costs
Appendix Table B.4
Mandatory Work Experience Programs: 
Five-Year Estimated Net Value per Program Group Member,
Social Perspective (in 2006 dollars)
1,409
SOURCES: Published reports from the program evaluations. See References and Bibliography. 
NOTES: The underlined numbers indicate that the taxpayer perspective is different than the government 
perspective. 
Estimates reflect discounting and adjustment for inflation.  
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random 
assignment characteristics of sample members.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
Tests of statistical significance were not performed.  
aThe return to society per net dollar invested is computed by dividing all effects from the social 
perspective (excluding operating costs) by operating costs (represents government investment).
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MFIP WRP
Financial SSP SSP Financial
Incentives Only Applicants Recipients Incentives Only
Component (Minnesota) (Canada)a (Canada)a (Vermont)
Financial effects
Earnings
Fringe benefitsb
Tax paymentsc 1,050 -2,774 -1,867 -131
Welfare paymentsd 1,870 2,786
Food stampsd NA NA
Medicaidde 2,626 NA NA 203
Otherf 86 0 95 8
Net gain or net loss (net value) 10,141 6,589 4,614 239
Return to participants per net dollar
invested by the government (ROI)gh NA 4.71 3.72 NA
Welfare-to-Work Program Benefits and Costs
Appendix Table B.14
Earnings Supplement Programs:
Five-Year Estimated Net Value per Program Group Member,
Participant Perspective (in 2006 dollars)
6,332
46
246
-873,6007,493
SOURCES: Published reports from the program evaluations. See References and Bibliography. 
NOTES: Estimates reflect discounting and adjustment for inflation.  
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment 
characteristics of sample members.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
Tests of statistical significance were not performed.  
aSSP Applicants estimates are for a six-year time horizon. SSP benefit-cost numbers were adjusted to U.S. 
dollars with the assumption that the values of the U.S. dollar is 75 cents to every one Canadian dollar. 
bThese include employer-paid health and life insurance, pension contributions, and worker's compensation.  
Paid leave is captured directly by the earnings estimate. Employee-paid Social Security and Medicare taxes are 
included as tax payments. WRP includes unemployment insurance compensation. The SSP programs include the 
employer contribution to Employment Insurance and the Canada Pension Plan (CPP) premiums.
cMFIP includes the Minnesota Working Family Credit. The SSP programs include the employee portion of 
the Canada Pension Plan premiums as a cost to the program group for simplicity. However, these costs would 
likely be more than offset by future pension payments.
dThe SSP programs include Income Assistance, Employment Insurance, and the SSP supplement as transfer 
payments. SSP does not have estimates of food stamps and Medicaid. SSP is a Canadian program and does not 
have equivalent transfer programs.
eWRP includes Medicaid, transitional Medicaid, Dr. Dynasaur, and Vermont Health Assistance Program.
f"Other" may include support service payments and compensation for community service jobs.
gThe return to participants per net dollar invested is computed by dividing the net benefits to the participant 
by the operating costs of the program (represents government investment).
hThe MFIP and WRP programs resulted in a savings in operating costs. As a result, the ROI calculations 
could not be easily interpreted and are therefore not presented in this table.
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 MFIP WRP
Financial SSP SSP Financial 
Incentives Only Applicants Recipients Incentives Only
Component (Minnesota) (Canada)a (Canada)a (Vermont)
Financial effects
Tax paymentsbc -1,053 2,774 1,867 129
Welfare paymentsd -1,870 -2,786
Food stampsd NA NA
Medicaidde -2,626 NA NA -203
Transfer administration -1,288 -86 -204 -197
Operating costsfg 341 -1,398 -1,240 284
Otherh 0 0 0
Net gain or net loss (net value) -10,958 -580 -2,363 -228
Return to budget per
net dollar invested (ROI)
 
4
ij NA 0.58 -0.91 NA
-6,332 -246
Government Perspective (in 2006 dollars)
Welfare-to-Work Program Benefits and Costs
Appendix Table B.15
Earnings Supplement Programs:
Five-Year Estimated Net Value per Program Group Member,
SOURCES: Published reports from the program evaluations. See References and Bibliography. 
NOTES: Estimates reflect discounting and adjustment for inflation.  
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment 
characteristics of sample members.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
Tests of statistical significance were not performed.  
aSSP Applicants estimates are for a six-year time horizon. SSP benefit-cost numbers were adjusted to U.S. 
dollars with the assumption that the values of the U.S. dollar is 75 cents to every one Canadian dollar. 
bTax payments include employer- and employee-paid Social Security and Medicare taxes, income taxes, 
and sales taxes.  
cMFIP includes the Minnesota Working Family Credit. The SSP programs include the employee portion of 
Employment Insurance and the Canada Pension Plan premiums as a cost to the program group for simplicity. 
However, these costs would likely be more than offset by future pension payments. The employer contribution 
to these premiums is included as part of fringe benefits of employment.
dThe SSP programs include Income Assistance, Employment Insurance, and the SSP supplement as 
transfer payments. SSP does not have estimates of food stamps and Medicaid. SSP is a Canadian program and 
does not have equivalent transfer programs.
eWRP includes Medicaid, transitional Medicaid, Dr. Dynasaur, and Vermont Health Assistance Program.
fOperating costs include the net cost of program and nonprogram activities (including support services). 
gSSP operating and Program Management Information System (PMIS) costs are not discounted.
h"Other" includes compensation for community service jobs.
iThe return to budget per net dollar invested is computed by dividing the sum of effects of transfer 
payments, transfer administration, and other effects by operating costs.
jThe MFIP and WRP programs resulted in a savings in operating costs. As a result, the ROI calculations 
could not be easily interpreted and are therefore not presented in this table.
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 MFIP WRP
Financial SSP SSP
Incentives Only Applicants Recipients Incentives Only
Component (Minnesota) (Canada)a (Canada)a (Vermont)
Financial effects
Financial 
Earnings
Fringe benefits
Tax payments 0 0 0 0
Welfare payments 0 0 0 0
Food stampsb 0 NA NA
Medicaid
0
b 0 NA NA
Transfer administratio
0
n -1,288 -86 -204 -197
Operating costs 341 -1,398 -1,240 284
Output from work experience 0 0 0 0
Other 86 0 95 12
Net gain or net loss (net value) -815 6,009 2,251 13
Return to society per net dollar
invested by the government (ROI)c NA 5.30 2.82 NA
Social Perspective (in 2006 dollars)
Welfare-to-Work Program Benefits and Costs
Appendix Table B.16
Earnings Supplement Programs:
Five-Year Estimated Net Value per Program Group Member,
46 7,493 3,600 -87
SOURCES: Published reports from the program evaluations. See References and Bibliography. 
NOTES: The underlined numbers indicate that the taxpayer perspective is different than the government 
perspective. 
Estimates reflect discounting and adjustment for inflation.  
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment 
characteristics of sample members.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
Tests of statistical significance were not performed.  
aSSP Applicants estimates are for a six-year time horizon. SSP benefit-cost numbers were adjusted to U.S. 
dollars with the assumption that the values of the U.S. dollar is 75 cents to every one Canadian dollar.
bSSP does not have estimates of food stamps and Medicaid. SSP is a Canadian program and does not have 
equivalent transfer programs
cThe MFIP and WRP programs resulted in a savings in operating costs. As a result, the ROI calculations 
could not be easily interpreted and are therefore not presented in this table.
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 FTP Jobs First Full WRP
Component (Florida) (Connecticut) (Vermont)
Financial effects
Earnings 2,998 2,561
Fringe benefitsa 447 350
Tax paymentsb -10 660 383
Welfare payments -1,045 -12
Food stamps -699 349
Medicaidc 0 1,455 -618
Otherd 292 1,478 598
Net gain or net loss (net value) 1,983 6,839 1,754
Return to participants per net dollar
invested by the government (ROI)e 0.19 2.51 1.12
Welfare-to-Work Program Benefits and Costs
Appendix Table B.17
Time-Limit-Mix Programs:
Five-Year Estimated Net Value per Program Group Member,
Participant Perspective (in 2006 dollars)
2,859
-1,468
SOURCES: Published reports from the program evaluations. See References and Bibliography. 
NOTES: Estimates reflect discounting and adjustment for inflation.  
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment 
characteristics of sample members.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
Tests of statistical significance were not performed.  
aThese include employer-paid health and life insurance, pension contributions, and worker's compensation. 
Paid leave is captured directly by the earnings estimate. Employee-paid Social Security and Medicare taxes are 
included as tax payments. WRP includes unemployment insurance compensation.
bFlorida does not have a state income tax.
cWRP includes Medicaid, transitional Medicaid, Dr. Dynasaur, and Vermont Health Assistance Program.
dMay include unemployment insurance compensation, support services, and compensation from community 
service jobs.
eThe return to participants per net dollar invested is computed by dividing the net benefits to the participant 
by the operating costs of the program (represents government investment).
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 FTP Jobs First Full WRP
Component (Florida) (Connecticut) (Vermont)
Financial effects
Tax paymentsab 239 -443 -206
Welfare payments 1,045 12
Food stamps 699 -349
Medicaidc 0 -1,455 618
Transfer administration 111 -151 167
Operating costsd -10,175 -2,725 -1,568
Othere -46 0 -78
Net gain or net loss (net value) -8,128 -5,111 402
Return to budget per
net dollar invested (ROI)f 0.20 -0.88 1.26
Government Perspective (in 2006 dollars)
Welfare-to-Work Program Benefits and Costs
Appendix Table B.18
Time-Limit-Mix Programs:
Five-Year Estimated Net Value per Program Group Member,
1,468
SOURCES: Published reports from the program evaluations. See References and Bibliography. 
NOTES: Estimates reflect discounting and adjustment for inflation.  
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment 
characteristics of sample members.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
Tests of statistical significance were not performed.  
aTax payments include employer- and employee-paid Social Security and Medicare taxes, income taxes, and 
sales taxes. 
bFlorida does not have a state income tax. 
cWRP includes Medicaid, transitional Medicaid, Dr. Dynasaur, and Vermont Health Assistance Program.
dOperating costs include the net cost of program and nonprogram activities (including support services). 
e"Other" may include unemployment insurance compensation and compensation from community service 
jobs.
fThe return to budget per net dollar invested is computed by dividing the sum of effects of transfer payments, 
transfer administration, and other effects by operating costs.
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FTP Jobs First Full WRP
Component (Florida) (Connecticut) (Vermont)
Financial effects
Earnings 2,998 2,561
Fringe benefits 447 350
Tax payments 0 0 0
Welfare payments 0 0 0
Food stamps 0 0 0
Medicaid 0 0 0
Transfer administration 111 -151 167
Operating costs -10,175 -2,725 -1,568
Output from work experience 0 0 0
Other 245 1,478 520
Net gain or net loss (net value) -6,374 1,512 1,978
Return to society per net dollar
invested by the government (ROI)a 0.37 1.55 2.26
2,859
Social Perspective (in 2006 dollars)
Welfare-to-Work Program Benefits and Costs
Appendix Table B.19
Time-Limit-Mix Programs:
Five-Year Estimated Net Value per Program Group Member,
SOURCES: Published reports from the program evaluations. See References and Bibliography. 
NOTES: The underlined numbers indicate that the taxpayer perspective is different than the government 
perspective. 
Estimates reflect discounting and adjustment for inflation.  
Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment 
characteristics of sample members.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
Tests of statistical significance were not performed.  
aThe return to society per net dollar invested is computed by dividing all effects from the social perspective 
(excluding operating costs) by operating costs (represents government investment).
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About MDRC 
MDRC is a nonprofit, nonpartisan social and education policy research organization dedicated 
to learning what works to improve the well-being of low-income people. Through its research 
and the active communication of its findings, MDRC seeks to enhance the effectiveness of so-
cial and education policies and programs. 
Founded in 1974 and located in New York City and Oakland, California, MDRC is best known 
for mounting rigorous, large-scale, real-world tests of new and existing policies and programs. 
Its projects are a mix of demonstrations (field tests of promising new program approaches) and 
evaluations of ongoing government and community initiatives. MDRC’s staff bring an unusual 
combination of research and organizational experience to their work, providing expertise on the 
latest in qualitative and quantitative methods and on program design, development, implementa-
tion, and management. MDRC seeks to learn not just whether a program is effective but also 
how and why the program’s effects occur. In addition, it tries to place each project’s findings in 
the broader context of related research — in order to build knowledge about what works across 
the social and education policy fields. MDRC’s findings, lessons, and best practices are proac-
tively shared with a broad audience in the policy and practitioner community as well as with the 
general public and the media. 
Over the years, MDRC has brought its unique approach to an ever-growing range of policy 
areas and target populations. Once known primarily for evaluations of state welfare-to-work 
programs, today MDRC is also studying public school reforms, employment programs for ex-
offenders and people with disabilities, and programs to help low-income students succeed in 
college. MDRC’s projects are organized into five areas: 
• Promoting Family Well-Being and Child Development 
• Improving Public Education 
• Raising Academic Achievement and Persistence in College 
• Supporting Low-Wage Workers and Communities 
• Overcoming Barriers to Employment 
Working in almost every state, all of the nation’s largest cities, and Canada and the United 
Kingdom, MDRC conducts its projects in partnership with national, state, and local govern-
ments, public school systems, community organizations, and numerous private philanthropies.  
